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NATURAL LAW IN THE STATES
Suzanna Sherry*
INTRODUCTION

Two of our most cherished constitutional myths are that we are,
more or less, carrying on the constitutional traditions of the framers, and that the framers' most significant innovation was the invention of a written constitution. Neither belief is true. This article is
the second in a series suggesting that our vision of the Constitution
differs in a particular and important way from that of the framers:
for us, it is the sole source of fundamental law, while for the framers
it was only one source among many.'
Our faith in the written constitution begins, as many of our constitutional myths do, with John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison.2 We
read him to say that the Constitution's writtenness is what gives it its
paramount authority.3 As a result, constitutional scholars from John
Marshall to John Ely have focused on and attached great significance
to the fact that American constitutions are written documents. Indeed, as the Constitution progressed from a recent-and contingent-political artifact to a sacred symbol, 4 the written text became
more and more central. Textualism is now the exclusive mode of
constitutional interpretation: whatever sources may illuminate the
meaning of the written text, that text--once interpreted-is itself
5
the sole source of fundamental or higher law.
This profoundly positivist attitude towards fundamental law, however, is a relatively modern invention. We tend to forget that the
same John Marshall who wrote Marbury also wrote Fletcher v. Peck, in
* Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota

1. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127
(1987). This first article suggests that the Constitution's framers inherited traditions
which held a written Constitution to be only one aspect of the fundamental law that
might serve to invalidate legislative enactments and that the framers never intended to
displace the prior tradition of multiple sources of fundamental law. Id. Thus, the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 "yielded a new view only of the nature, and not of
the relative authority, of a written constitution." Id. at 1128.
2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. See id. at 176.
4. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONsTrrTuTIONAL FAITH 9-17 (1988) (analogizing
Constitution to a sacred text and Supreme Court to a holy institution).
5. Walter Berns,JudicialReview and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 Sup. CT. REV.
49, 52. I have taken the term "textualism" from Thomas Grey. See Thomas Grey, The
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984); see also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1171
n.188 (describing a "textual constitutionalist" as "any judge who relies on the written
Constitution as the sole source of fundamental law, whatever method of interpretation is
used to elucidate that most impenetrable document").
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which the written constitution vied with unwritten principles of natural law for pride of place among the sources of fundamental law. 6
Reading Marshall's opinion in Fletcher should remind us that the
founding generation's conception of fundamental law was quite different from ours. That generation-which spans roughly forty
years, from 1780 to 1820-viewed the written constitution as only
one of several sources of fundamental law. Other sources, all unwritten, included the laws of God, the common law (largely derived
incrementally from custom and tradition), the law of nature, and
7
natural law.
Recently, the role of unwritten or natural law has. taken on new
significance. Several scholars have recently suggested that the view
that the founding generation believed in enforceable unwritten
rights is mistaken." Political events have also overtaken the scholarly debate over natural law. When the President nominated to the
6. See 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1910).
7. "The law of nature" and "natural law" were related but distinguishable in the
period I am discussing: the former was grounded in observation and human sentiment,
while the latter was founded upon abstract reason. For purposes of this article, the
differences among the various unwritten sources of higher law are irrelevant.
Therefore, I will use "unwritten law," "natural law," and "law of nature"
interchangeably. I will also use "natural rights" to refer to unwritten individual rights,
although there is also a subtle distinction between "natural rights" and "natural law."
See 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 676-77 (1988); cf.JoHN P. REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS

65-73, 90-95 (1986) (discussing different sources of extra-constitutional rights during
Revolutionary period).
One scholar has suggested that the founding generation (as well as most 17th and
18th century legal thinkers in England and on the Continent) were hopelessly confused
about the nature and sources of natural law, conflating deductive reason and inductive
custom in a way that defies logic. James Q. Whitman, Why Did Revolutionary Lawyers
Confuse Custom and Reason? 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1991). To the extent that
Whitman is correct that "[situdies that purport to explain the Founders' conception of
the Constitution are thus doomed to mislead," it is appropriate to note that my
argument is not that the founding generation necessarily had a single or coherent
conception of the Constitution, but that the historical evidence indicated
understandings that are inconsistent with our modem narrow textualism. Id. at 1367
(footnote omitted). The harder task of identifying exactly what they meant by natural
law (or "constitution") may indeed prove impossible if Whitman is right, but that should
not prevent us from identifying what they did not mean by "constitution."
8. See Thomas B. McAffee, The OriginalMeaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1215, 1226-27 (1990); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate JudicialEnforcement of "Unwritten" Individual
Rights? 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 421 (1991). At least two other scholars have recently
suggested that even textualjudicial review was originally much narrower than it is today,
a dispute peripherally related to the debate over natural law. See ROBERT L. CLINTON,
MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1989); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-

MADE LAW 4 (1986).
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Supreme*Court a man who had invoked natural law as a source of
individual rights, opponents suggested that a belief in natural law
was at least odd and perhaps outside the mainstream of American
constitutionalism, 9 and the nominee ultimately recanted his views.
Thus, the question whether the founders intended the written Constitution to serve as the sole source of individual rights has political
as well as historical consequences.
In this article, I will examine further historical evidence in support
of the conclusion that the founders expected judges to enforce
unenumerated as well as enumerated rights. Part I will briefly address the concerns of the two most recent scholarly refutations of
the natural law position.' 0 Both authors attempt primarily to provide alternative interpretations of basically the same historical evidence that has been read to support a natural law conclusion,
although both supplement that evidence with further illustrations of
their own interpretations of eighteenth century political theory.
The debate thus comes down to choosing, from among plausible
alternatives, the best interpretation. of a world-view that is fundamentally foreign to twentieth century observers.
The best evidence in support of a natural law heritage, then, is not
what the founders (or the philosophers who influenced them) said,
but what courts did. Thus, part II of this article will focus on further
examples of judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights. Because
one scholar explicitly relies on federalism and on the distinction between federal and state constitutions to justify his position against
natural law," I will examine how state courts made use of
unenumerated rights. The bulk of this article thus examines cases in
four states between 1788 and approximately 1830 to determine the
extent to which the belief in enforceable unenumerated rights was
widespread during that period.12

9. Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, noted that nominee Clarence Thomas
"is the first Supreme Court nominee in 50 years to maintain that natural law should be
readily consulted in constitutional interpretation." Laurence Tribe, Natural Law and the
Nominee, N.Y. TIMEs,July 15, 1991, at A15. Dean Geoffrey Stone has said that Thomas's
work is "further outside the mainstream of constitutional interpretation" than that of
rejected nominee Robert Bork. Clarence Page, Is Clarence Thomas in Imminent Danger of
Getting Borked? CHI. TRIB., July 10, 1991, at 11.
10. See infra notes 13-60 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of McAffee, see infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 64-340 and accompanying text.
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THE UNWRITTEN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

A.

Natural Law

Professor Helen K. Michael has directly challenged the thesis that
the founding generation conceived of judicially enforceable
unenumerated rights.1 3 It seems to be fairly widely accepted that
Edward Coke was one of the primary sources of the American institution of judicial review. Professor Michael's long article, however,
carefully canvasses some of the other philosophical influences on
the founders, including Locke, continental Enlightenment philosophers, radical English Whigs, and the Scottish Common Sense
School.' 4 She concludes that because these thinkers did not envision judicially enforceable unenumerated rights, the founders could
not have done so. 15 Although the article provides an excellent summary of some aspects of these varied influences, they are not particularly relevant to the question of whether eighteenth century
Americans believed in judicially enforceable natural rights. 16
As Professor Michael notes, none of these sources--other than
Coke-even conceived of the idea ofjudicial review.17 Each of these
13. Michael, supra note 8, at 421.
14. Id. at 427- 42.
15. See id. at 442-43.
16. Most of these schools of thought are also discussed in Suzanna Sherry, The
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary HistoricalScholarship, 5
CONST. COMMENTARY 323, 323-28 (1988), but for reasons mentioned in the text, I did
not find them relevant to my examination of natural law.
Professor Michael, moreover, fails to discuss the fact that while many of her sources
never mentioned individual natural rights, they did accept the enforceability of
unwritten law in the context of the law of nations, which was essentially natural law
applied to nations. See generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REv. 819, 821 (1989) (providing an overview of way
international law was treated in constitutional politics).
17. Michael, supra note 8, at 427-28.
[N]one of these theorists envisioned any type of judicial review ...
Grotius ... never conceived of the judiciary as an instrument to protect
. . . rights. . . . Grotius failed to conceive of any check on sovereign
misconduct .... Pufendorf ... did not embrace Coke's suggestion that
judges could pronounce void sovereign acts violating the express
convention. . . . Burlamaquie also never suggested that the judiciary
could control the sovereign's conduct by interpreting the written
fundamental laws .... Vattel .. .also failed to assign judges any role in
controlling the sovereign's conduct. . . . Montesquieu . . . failed to
conceive of any power ofjudicial revew.... Locke... would have found
any form of judicial interpretation of legislation objectionable ...
Country Whigs implicit[ly] reject[ed] . . .judicial review as a means of
policing the people's compact with their governors.... Common Sense
School's position is ...inconsistefnt with the practice ofjudicial review."
Id. at 427-31, 434, 436, 438, 442. But see CLINTON, supra note 8, at 21 (ascribing "rule
that [judiciary] voids acts of a delegated authority that exceed its mandate" to Vattel).

HeinOnline -- 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 174 1992-1993

19921

NATURAL LAW IN THE STATES

175

thinkers was determined to protect the liberty of the people from
the tyranny of rulers, and each had his own safeguards. Some of
these safeguards were obviously and directly incorporated into the
American Constitution, including separation of powers, a legislature
whose powers far surpassed those of the other branches, a careful
enumeration of the powers of government, and relatively frequent
elections of at least one house. But the phenomenon of judicial review-not explicit in the Constitution but understood and practiced
nevertheless-owes its existence to Coke alone.
Thus, Professor Michael's primary argument-that the
unenumerated rights thesis relies too heavily on Coke and consequently overlooks other important influences on the founders' 8-is
a non sequitur. Only Coke envisioned judicial review, and thus only
Coke could envision its contours. Americans drew on different
sources for different political inspirations, and Coke was the fountainhead for judicial review. 19
Moreover, some of Professor Michael's evidence can be interpreted to support extra-textual judicial review. For example, she
describes the Scottish Common Sense School as believing that "all
men possess inherently equal moral faculties through which to perceive goodness, justice and charity." 20 From this she concludes that
Americans influenced by the School would reject any form of judicial review. 2 ' However, although her description of the School's beliefs can be read as a direct challenge to Coke's notion that judges
are particularly well suited for judging because of their training in
the "artificial reason of the law," it also can be read to support extra-textual judicial review.
As Professor Shannon Stimson has recently shown, this very belief in the moral equality of all citizens transformed the jury from an
English enforcer of law to an American declarer of law. 2 2 Americans, less certain than their English cousins of the content of the
law, were able to look to new sources of legal authority, including
both judges and juries. Judicial review was partly derived from this
American notion that law was indeed natural: a reflection of the ordinary morality of the people. Thus, early American juries were
18. Michael, supra note 8, at 442-43.
19. See Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 992.
Indeed, Coke was apparently more generally influential than were any of the other
sources Professor Michael discusses. See id.
20. Michael, supra note 8, at 442.
21. See id.

22. SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAw: ANGLOAMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFOREJOHN MARSHALL (1990); see also Akhil R. Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1191-95 (1991).
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finders of law as well as fact.23 Juries were frequently seen as arbi24
ters of "an unwritten and unamendable natural constitution.P
Law need not be found solely in ponderous tomes-or written con25
stitutions-accessible only to learned lawyers.
As late as 1800, people distrusted the law as overly sophisticated
and accessible only to educated and aristocratic lawyers. Describing
this hostility after it had subsided, P.W. Grayson attributed to lawyers the belief that the law was "far too subtle, pure, intricate, and
profound for the apprehensions of vulgar intellects." 26 The "vulgar
intellects" naturally resented this, and turned instead to a belief that
27
law was natural and rational.
In Virginia, for example, anti-legalist sentiments of the mid-eighteenth century had a renaissance during the first decade of the nineteenth century. That hostility often took the form of disputes
between the professional lawyers and the county justices. "In the
minds of the lawyers the purpose of the law was to facilitate the
speedy and expeditious completion of business," while the judges
believed that "some semblances should exist between the laws of
God and those of man." 28 There was widespread distrust of law
because people viewed it as being in conflict with justice, and as "a
mysterious, unintelligible force that was capable of being 'twisted'
to the advantage of those with 'cunning,' power and ambition '." 29
Perry Miller has shown how the literature of the period also reflected the popular preference for reason and nature over textual23. See, e.g., Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
289, 299-300 (1966); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background ofJohn
Marshall's ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 917-18 (1978).
24. Ruth Wedgewood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom ofJonathan Robbins, 100 YALE LJ.
229, 297 (1990).
25. The mistrust of lawyers and legalism, and the perception that law was not
accessible to the common people but should be, did not originate with Americans. See
Michael K. Curtis, In Pursuitof Liberty: The Levellers andthe American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST.
COMMENTARY 359, 359-61 (1991).
Seventeenth century English Levellers first
demanded that the law-written mostly in French or Latin-be translated into English
and made accessible to all. Id. Interestingly, the Levellers, who were unsuccessful in
their own country, also invented or rediscovered many of the rights that would later find
their way into the American Bill of Rights. Id.
26. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 103 (1962) (quoting P.W. GRAYSON, VICE UNMASKED (1830)).
27. See id.
28. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 106-07 (1981). For a discussion of the
eighteenth century recurrence of anti-legalism, see id. at 230-52. Roeber discusses the
disputes in "Court" and "Country" terms, but the discussion also lends itself to a
natural law/positivist characterization. See id. at 106-08.
29. WHITE, supra note 7, at 77; see CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 12-18 (1981).
REV.
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ism. 3 0 Davy Crockett's semi-fictional "Autobiography" stated that
his judicial decisions were never reversed because he "gave [his] decisions on the principles of common justice and honesty between
man and man, and relied on natural born sense, and not on law
learning to guide [him].''

31

Especially in the back-country-to

which large portions of the population were migrating and political
power shifting 32 -there was a strong popular hostility towards law
and legalism. Even some state court judges were explicitly hostile to
the law as written. A New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice instructed a jury "to do justice between the parties not by any quirks
of the law out of Coke or Blackstone-books that I have never read
33
and never will-but by common sense as between man and man."
Such hostility might tend to prevent the exercise ofjudicial review
in the first place, as Michael implies.3 4 Alternatively, however, hostility to the narrowness of legalism and textualism might induce
judges who did engage in judicial review to tailor their decisions to
the popular clamor for accessible, natural justice. Thus to the extent that eighteenth and early nineteenth century courts reviewed
statutes for consistency with higher law, the climate of the day suggests that they might have been more likely to use unwritten than
written law. And as Part II of this article will show, state court
judges of the period did indeed engage in judicial review, and used
natural law at least as often as they used written constitutional law to
adjudicate individual rights.35
The historical perception that principles of natural justice are
more generally accessible than technical legal learning is understandable. Robert Ferguson has noted that one hallmark of the
transition from extra-textualism to textualism (and thus to positivism) is that "[t]echnical competence triumph[s] over general learning and philosophical discourse."'3 6 Lawyers cease to "searc[h] for a
declaration derived from common usage and consistent with nature," but instead think "in terms of the specific commands that so30. MILLER, supra note 26, at 102-03.

31. Id. at 102

(quoting AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF DAVEY CROCKETT).

32. See generally FLETCHER M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH
ATLTc
STATES, 1776-1860, at 142-50 (DaCapo Press 1971) (1930) (discussing
regional influences in ante-bellum south); Jerome J. Nadelhaft, "The Snarls of Invidious
Animals": The Democratization of Revolutionary South Carolina, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 62 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds. 1981) (noting roots of

political difference in pre-revolutionary era).
33.
(1988)
34.
35.
36.

Gordon Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1293, 1301
(quoting Associate Justice John Duoley).
Michael, supra note 8, at 445-56.
See infra notes 62-340 and accompanying text.
ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETrERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 200 (1984).
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ciety ha[s] placed upon itself."3 7 Textualist lawyers and judges no
longer share their education and their sources with the general public: they have turned from reading literature and philosophy to
reading cases. In effect, their status as members of the community is
diminished, and with it their ability to speak for the community. At
that point, but not before, textualism may become more attractive as
a method of constraining judges who no longer share the natural
rationality of the populace.3 8 Thus, Professor Michael's discussion
of the Scottish Common Sense School can be read to support a thesis that Americans of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were committed to a regime of unwritten natural law, derived
39
from custom, tradition, and the morality of the common people.
Professor Michael also questions whether state courts practiced
judicial review at all, much less extra-textual judicial review. 40 She
argues that the "few cases" involving judicial review did not legitimize it-particularly given hostile public reaction-and that state
constitutions "both failed to authorize judicial review and severely
limited the judicial independence required for the growth of this
practice." 41 Professor Michael may be right in theory, but the evidence of state court practice contradicts her conclusion. After a
brief discussion of another critique of natural rights jurisprudence, I
will return to a discussion of how state courts engaged in extra-textual judicial review. 42
37. Id.
38. The textualist mistrust of judges as "other" persists today, on both the left and
the right. Mark Tushnet explicitly rejects the notion that judges might be able to
recognize and enforce our community values: "Attaching the general possessive our to
the word community makes a false claim of fact. At most judges can interpret 'their'
community's values." MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 144 (1988). Michael McConnell, a prominent theorist of the New
Right, echoes that sentiment: "Rather than natural right, judges are more likely to
impose upon us the prejudices of their class." Michael McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense
of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 105 (1988).
The historical juristic response to this failure of community was to narrow the focus of
law and claim for it a scientific method and a detachment from politics. See FERGUSON,
supra note 36, at 201; WHITE, supra note 7,at 110-1l; Nelson, supra note 23, at 932-36.
Linda Hirshman suggests that this response has failed, and points to the popular
hostility to judge Bork as evidence. Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte, Bloom, andBork: An Essay
on the Moral Education ofJudges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 186-87 (1988). She contends that
the citizenry rejected the moral relativism of Bork's narrow textualist view in favor of a
value-based theory of law. Id. at 187. Her recommended cure for the modern judicial
malaise, incidentally, is consistent with its nineteenth century cause: judges and lawyers
should read literature. Id. at 231.
39. See Michael, supra note 8,at 442.
40. See id. at 448.
41. Id. at 455-57, 490.
42. See infra notes 65-340 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Amendment

Directly related to the question of unenumerated rights is the current debate over the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.
Long neglected by historians as well as lawyers, 43 the Ninth Amendment is enjoying something of a resurgence. Its command that
"[t]he enumeration of certain rights . . .shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people" 4 4 invites a natural
law reading. Indeed, many scholars have recently read it to incorporate into the Constitution protection for unenumerated or natural
rights .45
Professor Thomas McAffee denies this interpretation, and suggests instead that the Ninth Amendment is a guarantee of both federalism and the limited nature of the federal government. 46 The
"rights ...retained by the people" are simply the "residual" rights
that are left when a government of limited power is restricted to the
exercise of its enumerated powers. Although Professor McAffee
recognizes that his interpretation of the Ninth Amendment "provide[s] no clear verdict" on the question of whether the founding
generation envisioned rights beyond those listed or referred to in
the Constitution 4 7-since natural rights would have existed even
without the Ninth Amendment-he also suggests that the evidence
he examines undercuts a natural rights thesis. 48 In particular, he
denies that the enactment of the Ninth Amendment itself can be
used to support a natural rights thesis, and offers further evidence
from the ratification debates in opposition to a claim that there was
49
a consensus in favor of unwritten rights.
Professor McAffee's fascinating review of American notions of
"rights" and "powers" is a useful addition to the history of the period. His basic argument is that "rights" and "powers" were two
sides of the same coin, and that either an enumeration of rights or
43. David Currie has commented that the Amendment was -[o]verwhelmingly
ignored for most of its history." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUrrION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 48 (1985).
44. U.S CONST. amend. IX.

45. See, e.g., THE RIGHTS RETAINED By THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and
FundamentalRights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987); Calvin R. Massey,
The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and its Implicationsfor State ConstitutionalLaw, 1990 WIs.
L. REV. 1229; Symposium, Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 37

(1988); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional? 100
1073 (1991).
46. McAffee, supra note 8, at 1225-27.
47. Id. at 1227.
48. Id. at 1318-19.
49. Id. at 1222-23, 1287-93.
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an enumeration of powers served the same underlying purpose of
50
confining the new federal government to strictly enforced limits.
Unfortunately, Professor McAffee's narrow thesis does not support his more generalized rejection either of unenumerated rights
or of the Ninth Amendment as a reference to such rights. He attempts to draw a distinction between "reserved" or "residual"
rights and "unenumerated" rights by suggesting that the former
5
were limits on enumerated powers rather than independent rights. '
In either case, however, the consequence is that citizens were protected against governmental abuse of its enumerated powers. The
label does not matter: if citizens were protected in ways beyond
those specifically listed in the Constitution, judges enforcing that
protection had to look beyond the written Constitution. Thus, Professor McAffee's concession that the Ninth Amendment was intended to protect "reserved" rights and limit the government's
enumerated powers gives away the game.
Indeed, many of his arguments, although phrased as a challenge
to the natural law interpretation of the historical background of the
Ninth Amendment, support a natural rights reading of that Amendment. For example, he disputes construing certain Federalist ratification-era statements as implying that a bill of rights would be
dangerous because of the inability to construct an exhaustive list of
existing rights. 52 Instead, argues Professor McAffee, "the true Federalist concern was that enumeration would undermine the system
of reserved rights," 5 3 and that the Federalists "feared the elimina54
tion of the rights secured by the system of enumerated powers."
The rights that were "reserved" or "secured," however, were necessarily unenumerated prior to the Bill of Rights, and Professor McAffee's thesis is that the Ninth Amendment was designed to ensure
that such "reserved" or "secured" rights remained unaffected by
the enactment of the Bill of Rights. 55 Again, the label seems irrelevant: Professor McAffee would agree, I think, that there were unspecified rights (or unspecified limits on governmental powers) and
that the Ninth Amendment was designed to guard against the possibility that later generations would read into the Bill of Rights an
intent to codify all of those limits.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 1261-65.
See id. at 1249-77.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1317.
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Moreover, Professor McAffee's argument fails in another way. A
lynchpin of his thesis is that a bill of rights has a different meaning
depending on whether it is applied to a government of general powers or a government of limited powers.5 6 He suggests that the founders were concerned only about the implications of a listing of rights
in the federal Constitution, and thus that there was no generalized
"fear of an unintended positivist inference against implied rights,"
but rather a fear of "the evisceration of the residual rights secured
by the limited grants of power." '5 7 If Professor McAffee were correct, we would not expect to find the equivalent of the Ninth
Amendment in state constitutions because it would serve no purpose. In fact, however, twelve states that adopted sixteen different
constitutions up to the time of the Civil War incorporated either the
exact language of the Ninth Amendment or a close variation on it.58
According to Professor McAffee's theory, there is no reason to incorporate language protecting "reserved" rights in the constitution
56. Id. at 1249-51.
57. Id. at 1254.
58. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 30, reprinted in 1
CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE

THE FEDERAL AND STATE
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 98 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS]; ARK.
CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 24, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 270; CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 392; IOWA
CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 25, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1139; IOWA
CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 24, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1125; KAN.
CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 20, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1243;
KAN. CONST. of 1857, Bill of Rights, § 24, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
1217; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 22, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
1181; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
1224; ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 24, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, supra, at 1649;
MD. CONST. of 1851, Declaration of Rights, art. 42, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 1716; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 16, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTrrTUTIONS,
supra, at 1993; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra,
at 2600; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 20, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at
2915; OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 34, reprintedin 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3000;
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3224.

Another 12 states incorporated similar language into their constitutions after the Civil
War. ALA.CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 36, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 119;
ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 24, reprinted in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 291;
COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. II, § 28, reprintedin 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 478; GA.
CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 811; IDAHO
CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 2 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 920; MIss.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 32, 4 STATE CONSTrrIUTIONS, supra, at 2071; MONT. CONST. of
1889, art. III, § 30, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2305; NEB. CONST. of
1866, art. I, § 20, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2351; NEV. CONST. of
1864, art. I, § 20, reprinted in 4 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2404; N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. I, § 37, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2803; UTAH CONST. of
1895, art. I, § 25, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3704; WYo. CONST. of
1889, art. I, § 36, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 4120.
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of a general government, such as a state government. 5 9 Because
both the state constitutions and the federal constitution contain
such language strongly suggests that the language was put in to
safeguard unwritten inalienable rights. 60
II.

UNWRITrEN STATE CONSTITUTIONS

The foregoing arguments notwithstanding, much of the theoretical debate over the uses of natural law comes down to which interpretation of various writings and statements one favors. Neither
Professor Michael nor Professor McAffee provides any evidence
about the actual practices of courts during the period at issue. In
my earlier article, I examined the role of natural law in state courts
up to 1787 and federal courts thereafter. 6' In the remainder of this
article I will examine the decisions of courts in four states from 1788
through the first several decades of the nineteenth century for evidence that extra-textual constitutional interpretation was common
throughout the founding period.
Textualism provided an obviously incomplete description of fundamental law from the very beginning of the constitutional era because written declarations of rights afforded only partial protection
to citizens of the new United States. The notion of a written declaration of rights, familiar to modern observers from the federal constitution and the justly, celebrated declarations of rights in the
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania constitutions, was not
universal in the early republic. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, approximately half the states had no separate declaration of rights appended to their constitutions. 62 Those states
without bills of rights often incorporated some protection of individual rights into the structural portions of the written constitution,
but the protections were usually minimal and were especially inadequate to deal with the phenomenal commercial growth of the early
nineteenth century.
States without a declaration of rights are a particularly fruitful
source for investigating the influence of unwritten law on judicial
decisions. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the decisions of
states with a bill of rights as well; otherwise the most that can be
59. McAffee, supra note 8, at 1254.
60. For another critique of and response to Professor McAffee's arguments, see
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 638-40 (1991); Rosen, supra note 45, at 1075.

61. Sherry, supra note 1, at 1134-46, 1166-76.
62. Seven of the thirteen original states enacted separate bills or declarations of

rights. By 1800, only eight of sixteen states had them.
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demonstrated is that judges used unwritten law in the absence of
more direct written guidance. The distinct possibility that the
South's legal culture and development differed from that of the
North 6 3 suggests a further point of comparison. Only a small
number of states, however, had more than one or two reported constitutional decisions during this period. Thus I have limited my examination to four states: Virginia (a southern state with a bill of
rights); Massachusetts (a northern state with a bill of rights); New
York (a northern state without a bill of rights); and South Carolina
(a southern state without a bill of rights).r 4
A.

Virginia6 5

The Virginia Constitution of 1776 was one of the earliest state
constitutions; the drafting process began prior to the Declaration of
Independence. The constitution was drafted and adopted by a specially constituted committee of the Virginia House of Burgesses (the
lower chamber of the legislature), without popular ratification. It
remained in effect until 1830.
The 1776 Constitution, like those of several other states, included
a long and detailed Bill of Rights that appeared to be memorializing
unwritten rights rather than enacting new ones. This natural law
heritage was reflected in the very first section of the Bill of Rights,
which began by declaring that "all men are by nature equally free
63. See Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (1985).
64. I have omitted any cases dealing with the possible conflict between slavery and
natural law. The extreme political sensitivity of the slavery issue-culminating in the
Civil War-makes the courts' dealings with that issue unrepresentative of their
treatment of natural law generally. Indeed, as William Nelson has suggested, the
controversy over slavery may have significantly contributed to the ultimate decline of
natural law in the courts. William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon
Styles ofJudicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 513 (1974).
Therefore, I chose to focus on more ordinary and less controversial judicial
decisionmaking.
It is well-established that neither the Supreme Court nor most state courts used
principles of natural justice to abolish slavery. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
AccusED: ANTISLAVERY AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 159-74 (1975) (outlining legal attacks
on fugitive slave law); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM,
AND Comrrv 46-69 (1981) (discussing Pennsylvania judicial treatment of slavery cases);
WHITE, supra note 7, at 675-703 (discussing Supreme Court's treatment of slavery cases).
It is possible, however, to read at least the Virginia court's failure to do so as a conflict
between two natural rights rather than as a triumph of positive over natural law. For an
elaboration of this idea, see Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual
Interpretation, 53 ALB. L. REV. 297, 316-26 (1989).
65. A previous version of this section was published in Sherry, supra note 64, at 302-
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and independent, and have certain inherent rights."6 Further evidence of the natural law influence on the 1776 Bill of Rights is
found in some of its provisions that seem to reflect natural law
precepts rather than injunctive limits on the government. 67 For example, section 15 states: "That no government, or the blessings of
liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to
justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." ' 68 Although the Virginia courts did occasionally refer to the admonition to recur to
fundamental principles, 69 the remainder of section 15 does not appear to be directed at any particular governmental action. Language like this, scattered throughout the Virginia Bill of Rights,
suggests again that the authors were merely committing to writing
familiar ancient principles.
Some of the specific principles included a guarantee of freedom
70
of the press and a right to jury trials, as well as religious toleration.
It is important to note, however, that the Virginia Bill of Rights included neither a prohibition against ex post facto or other retrospective laws nor a requirement of compensation when private property
was taken for public purposes. 7 ' Nevertheless, Virginia judges in
the early republic used unwritten or natural law to protect against
both retrospective laws and uncompensated takings. Judges and
lawyers also relied generally on unwritten natural law principles as
much as on the written text, occasionally explicitly privileging the
former over the latter.
The most suggestive endorsement of unwritten law is an 1809 re72
trospectivity case, Currie's Administrator v. Mutual Assurance Society.
The legislature had incorporated an insurance company in 1794 and
then had changed the charter in 1805. 7 3 Plaintiff was an insured
whose risk had risen as a result of the later act, and he challenged it
66. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1,reprinted in 7 STATE

CONSTITUTIONS, supra

note 58, at 3813.
67. Robert Palmer made a similar observation about the 1776 Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights. Robert L. Palmer, Liberties as ConstitutionalProvisions, 1776-1791,
in CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 65-66 (William E.
Nelson & Robert L. Palmer eds., 1987).
68. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 15, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTrrTUONS, supra

note 58, at 3814.
69. See, e.g., The Case of theJudges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 143 (1788). For a discussion
of the case, see infra note 89-95 and accompanying text.
70. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
58, at 3812-14.
71. See id.
72. 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315 (1809).
73. Id.
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as unconstitutionally retrospective. 74 The court upheld the 1805
statute: Judge Roane found that the act worked no injustice, 7 5 and
Judge Fleming-in an opinion largely irrelevant to our concerns76
that the original act reserved the right to change the charter.
Judge Roane, however, also delivered a stinging refutation of the
7
defendant's attempt to limit the court to a textualist analysis.
John Wickham, 78 counsel for the defendant, had argued that laws
may be unjust, but still valid: "No doubt every government ought to
keep in view the great principles of justice and moral right, but no
authority is expressly given to the judiciary by the Constitution of
Virginia, to declare a law void as being morally wrong or in violation
79
of a contract."
Judge Roane vehemently rejected that limit on the court's authority. 80 He wrote that the legislature's authority is limited "by the
constitutions of the general and state governments; and limited also
by considerations of justice." 8' He then directly denied the defendant's textualist assumption:
It was argued by a respectable member of the bar, that the
legislature had a right to pass any law, however just, or unjust,
reasonable, or unreasonable. This is a position which even the
courtly Judge Blackstone was scarcely hardy enough to contend
for, under the doctrine of the boasted omnipotence of parliament. What is this, but to lay prostrate, at the footstool of the
legislature, all our rights of person and property, and abandon
those great objects, for the protection of which, alone, all free
82
governments have been instituted?
74. Id. at 315-16.
75. Id. at 350.
76. Id. at 355 (Fleming, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 347-49.
78. John Wickham was a prominent Virginia lawyer who often collaborated with
Edmund Randolph. In addition to the case in the text, Wickham and Randolph were cocounsel for the church parties in Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804), discussed
infta at notes 118-131 and accompanying text. Their most famous collaborative effort
was defending Aaron Burr. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND
TERM, 1805-1809, at 296, 310-11 (1974); JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A
BIOGRAPHY 357-58 (1974); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR, 267-68
(1966).
79. Currie'sAdm'r, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) at 341.
80. Id. at 347.
81. Id. at 346.
82. Id. at 346-47. Roane's (probably mistaken) insistence that even Blackstone
would admit to natural justice limits on legislative power was strikingly similar to a
statement by James Iredell over 20 years earlier: "Without an express Constitution the
powers of the Legislature would undoubtedly have been absolute (as Parliament in
Great Britain is held to be), and any act passed not inconsistent with naturaljustice (for that
curb is vowed by judges even in England), would have been binding on the people."
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Although he ultimately concluded that the statute did not deprive
the plaintiff of any vested rights, Roane's outrage at the suggestion
that he was confined to a textualist analysis is palpable.
Another fairly explicit reliance on unwritten natural law may be
found in a 1793 case in the Virginia Court of Chancery. Chancellor
George Wythe, an eminent Virginia jurist and the holder of the first
Law Chair in the United States, decided in Page v. Pendleton that the
Virginia legislature could not unilaterally discharge debts Virginians
owed to British citizens. 8 3 He did so on the ground that a legislature could not bind one who was not a member of the society, be84
cause the requisite consent was lacking.
In the course of his opinion, Wythe wrote several long footnotes
explaining his holding. Two of these footnotes contained extensive
discussions of natural law principles. To support his holding that
"the right to money due to an enemy cannot be confiscated," Wythe
explained in a footnote:
If this seem contrary to what is called authority, as perhaps it
may seem to some men, the publisher of the opinion will be
against the authority, when, in a question depending, like the
present, on the law of nature, the authority is against reason,
which is affirmed to be the case here. 8 5
He then proceeded to explain why the "authority" was contrary to
reason.
Later, in considering who might be bound by what laws, Wythe
included an even more interesting footnote. He began:
The position in the sixth article of our bill of rights, namely,
that men are not bound by laws to which they have not, by
themselves, or by representatives of their election, assented, is
not true of unwritten or common law, that is, of the law of
nature, called common law, because it is common to all mankind.... They are laws which men, who did not ordain them,
have not power to abrogate. 86
He then explained how the disenfranchised and subsequent generations can nevertheless be held to have consented to the passage of
positive laws in which they actually played no part.8 7 Clearly, Wythe
believed that fundamental law included natural, unwritten law,
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL

83. Page v. Pendeton (1793), in
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

GRIFFITH J.

172 (1857).

GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY

211, 213 (B.B. Minor ed. 1852).

213-15.
212 n.(b).
216 n.(e).
216 n.(e), 217.
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although his ruling did not depend on much unwritten law. Nor is it
important that Wythe was sitting in equity rather than in law, since
his dicta were apparently meant more as treatise comments on law
in general than as direct authority in the case before him.
These two cases are the most explicit examples of a pattern that
began as early as 1788 and lasted for at least forty years. Virginia
courts had been reviewing the validity of statutes since at least 1782,
and perhaps earlier.8 8 The reliance on natural law, however, was
first apparent in 1788. In that year, the Virginia legislature passed
an act directing sitting judges of the court of appeals to take on new
duties as district court judges. No additional compensation was
provided, and the judges argued that imposing additional duties
without compensation was equivalent to a diminution of salary, and
thus unconstitutional. Although no suit was instituted, the court of
appeals nevertheless made its opinion known to the legislature.
Four months after the act was passed, the judges delivered and sent
to the legislature "The Respectful Remonstrance of the Court of
Appeals." 89 In it, the judges declared an obligation to favor the
written constitution over statutes inconsistent with it and found the
1788 act inconsistent. 90 Rather than invalidate the act, however,
they simply refused to execute it and requested the legislature to
repeal it.
Despite the overt references to the written constitution, the Remonstrance seemed to base its conclusions on both written and unwritten law. The Remonstrance first set out the facts, and then framed
two questions: whether the 1788 act was unconstitutional, and if so,
whether "it was their duty to declare that the act must yield to the
88. See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). There have been persistent
rumors of an earlier case, described by Thomas Jefferson in his reports of general court
decisions prior to independence. Robin v. Hardaway (1772), in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA, FROM 1730 TO 1740
AND FROM 1768 TO 1772, 109, 113-18 (W.S. Hein 1981) (1829); see 1 HELEN T.
CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO, 91-92
(Octagon Books 1968) (1926); COVER, supra note 64, at 19. No other record of this case
exists, and Jefferson's report may be inaccurate. Moreover, although the plaintiffs,
according to Jefferson, did contend that the statute at issue was void (as "contrary to
natural right"), Jefferson's description suggests that the primary argument was that the
statute had been repealed. Robin v. Hardaway (1772), in JEFFERSON, supra, at 109, 113118. Later Virginia cases dealing with the same pair of statutes generally failed to cite
Robin at all, suggesting thatJefferson's report may have been inaccurate. See, e.g., Butt v.

Rachel, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 209 (1813); Pallas v. Hill, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 149 (1807);
Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806). The one case I am aware of that
did cite Robin used it only to support the proposition that the earlier statute had been
repealed. Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665, 681 (1831).
89. The Case of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 141 (1788).

90. Id. at 145-46.

HeinOnline -- 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 187 1992-1993

188

CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61

constitution." 9' The judges began their analysis by noting that in
"forming their judgment" on both questions "they had recourse to
that article in the declaration of rights, that no free government, or
the blessing of liberty can be preserved to any people but (among
92
other things) by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."
In discussing "fundamental principles" and their relationship to
the constitution, the judges relied very clearly on unwritten law.
They declared that "[tihe propriety and necessity of the independence of the judges is evident in reason and the nature of their office," explaining that only an independent judiciary can mete out
impartial justice to the rich and the poor, the government and the
people. 93 Thus, the "fundamental principles" to which the constitution directed recurrence were the same principles of reason and justice that animated natural law doctrines. Moreover, although the
Remonstrance later examined and relied upon specific provisions of
the written constitution, it discussed "fundamental principles"
first.

94

One final aspect of the Remonstrance might confirm its natural law
basis. Immediately after concluding that an independent judiciary is
a fundamental principle, the judges considered "whether the people
have secured, or departed from [this principle] in the constitution,
or form of government." 95 Because the Remonstrance ultimately concluded that the constitution did secure the independence of the judiciary, we cannot know what the judges might have done had they
decided otherwise. The very asking of the question, however, tentatively suggests the possibility that the "fundamental principles" adverted to in the Bill of Rights (which, remember, merely declared
ancient principles) were superior even to the written frame of government. It is quite possible that the judges were prepared to invalidate or ignore any part of the written constitution that directly
conflicted with unwritten law.
Four years later, the Virginia court decided an actual case implicating the constitutionality of a statute. In Turner v. Turner's Executor
the plaintiffs challenged the validity of a legislative enactment that
changed the law of gifts of slaves, alleging that it was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. 96 Although President 9 7 Edmund Pendleton
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 234-35 (1792).
In Virginia, President was the equivalent of Chief Justice.
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ultimately upheld the law as prospective only, he suggested that a
retrospective law would be invalid--despite the absence of any provision in the Virginia Constitution outlawing either ex post facto or
retrospective laws. 98
Pendleton noted that a law retrospectively affecting title to slaves
would be "subject to every objection which lies to ex post facto laws,
as it would destroy rights already acquired." 99 The power to make
such laws, he contended, was "oppressive and contrary to the principles of the constitution." 10 0 Because the constitution did not contain any provision prohibiting retrospective laws,' 0 ' Pendleton's
conclusion must rest either directly on unwritten principles of natural justice or on the integration of such principles into the "fundamental principles" language of the written constitution. The
98. Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 238. There was some debate during that time about the
meaning of the term "ex post facto." Some thought it referred only to retrospective
criminal laws, and some believed that it encompassed retrospective civil laws as well. See
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENrrIoN OF 1787, at 547, 640 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (noting debates
of Dickinson, August 29 and Mason, September 14). That dispute, however, is
irrelevant to the discussion in the text; Virginia's written constitution contained no bar
to any type of retrospective law. See supra note 66-71 and accompanying text.
99. Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 237.
100. Id. In 1797, an enterprising plaintiffs' counsel acted upon Judge Pendleton's
suggestion that ex post facto laws were void, and added the idea that governmental taking
of property required compensation. His arguments were to no avail: the court in Carter
v. Tyler upheld a statute that converted all entailed estates into fee simple estates, thus
depriving remaindermen of previously acquired contingent rights. 5 Va. (1 Call) 165,
186-87 (1797). Counsel for the plaintiff had argued primarily that the statute should not
be construed to dock entails in existence prior to the passage of the act. Id. at 167. He
also contended, however, although without much elaboration, that any other
interpretation would render the act "unconstitutional and void; because it would be ex
post facto in its operation, taking away private rights without any public necessity, and
without making the injured parties any compensation for them." Id. at 172. No
authority was given for this proposition, nor could any textual support be provided. As
noted, the Virginia Bill of Rights contained neither an ex post facto clause nor a just
compensation clause. See supra note 70-71 and accompanying text.
Judge Pendleton construed the statute as operating retrospectively, but then did not
discuss its constitutionality. Carter,5 Va. (1 Call) at 187. This is especially puzzling since
Pendleton had remarked during argument that "the defendant's counsel are desired to
confine themselves to the question, whether the act is void, as being unconstitutional."
Id. at 174. Defendant's counsel apparently did not address, the question, despite being
enjoined to do so by the President. Id. at 174-79. Pendleton never returned to the
question. See id. at 174-87. Carter therefore affords some support for the notion that
lawyers used natural law principles in arguing cases, and no evidence at all on how
courts received such arguments. In the early nineteenth century, however, and thus at
least arguably in 1797, "arguments of counsel were regarded as themselves sources of
law." WHITE, supra note 7, at 291. Thus, counsel's reliance on natural law in Carter
provides some evidence that unwritten principles of natural law'-whether or not
incorporated into the written constitution-were considered dispositive.
101. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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inference of direct reliance on natural law is perhaps stronger for
two reasons. Pendleton did not cite the "fundamental principles"
provision in Turner,'0 2 while in the Remonstrance, written only four
years earlier (with Pendleton's participation), the judges did cite the
03
"fundamental principles" provision.'
Moreover, Pendleton's own opinion in an 1802 case, Elliot's Executor v. Lyell, directly attributed the invalidity of retrospective laws to
"natural justice."' 0 4 Lyell involved a 1786 statute that changed the
law of obligations as it related to joint obligors. 0 5 The question
before the court was whether the statute applied to a contract entered into prior to the enactment of the statute.' 0 6 Counsel for the
appellant argued that a careful reading of the statute showed that
the legislature had not intended the statute to apply to existing contracts.' 0 7 He also contended that "perhaps" the legislature could
not give the statute retrospective effect because it would then be
acting in a judicial capacity by interpreting rather than making
law.10 8 This mingling of legislative and judicial functions would, he
contended, violate the constitutional guarantee that the branches of
government be kept distinct.' 0 9 This oblique suggestion was the
only argument the appellant made to suggest the invalidity of the
statute; he relied primarily on the statutory construction argu-

ments. l0 The opinion was unclear as to whether counsel was contending that the statute should be construed to make it
constitutional, that the legislature could not have intended to enact

an unconstitutional statute, or that the statute as enacted was unconstitutional. The statutory question was clearly thought to be
more significant than the constitutional one.

OnlyJudge Roane, however, followed counsel's lead and confined
himself to statutory interpretation. Noting that "[tihe question here
is not whether the Legislature have power to pass a retrospective
law,"" '1
but whether they had done so, he concluded that the statute
102. 8 Va. (4 Call) at 234-38.
103. The Case of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 143 (1788).
104. 7 Va. (3 Call) 268, 285 (1802).

105. Id.at 269.
106. Id. at 277.
107. Id. at 272-73.
108. Id. at 274. Chancellor Kent of New York relied on the same argument a few
years later to deny the validity of a retrospective law in Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7Johns. 477,
508-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent, C.J., concurring). For a discussion of Dash, see infra

notes 236-250 and accompanying text.
109. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 274.
110. Id. at 274-75.
111. Id. at 277.
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could not be read to have retrospective effect. 1 2 The other three
judges agreed with his conclusion, but each indicated that the statutory interpretation was compelled by the fundamental principle
against retrospective laws.
Judge Fleming held that the legislature could not be presumed to
intend retrospective effect because "retrospective laws [are] odious
in their nature."' 13 Moreover, he stated that construing the statute
retrospectively, would "abolish the best established principles of
justice." 114 Similarly, Judge Lyons concluded that the legislature
"ought not to be presumed to have willed injustice."''115 He characterized retrospective laws as "unjust and improper" and "necessarily oppressive," and noted that construing the law as retrospective
't 6
in operation "would destroy the principles of natural justice." "
Both Fleming and Lyons thus avoided holding the law invalid, but
did so under the canon that statutes should be construed so as to
avoid doubts about their constitutionality. Although this does not
demonstrate that either judge would have invalidated the statute if
they could not construe it consistently with natural justice, it does
suggest a strong relationship between unwritten law and judicial
review.
Judge Pendleton, who had been hinting since 1782 that judges
might strike down unconstitutional laws," t 7 and who wrote an opinion invalidating a state statute only a year after Lyell, 1 I8 took a rather
disingenuous approach. He first declared that retrospective laws
were "against the principles of natural justice" 19 and then deliberately avoided the consequences of that conclusion. Fleming and Lyons relied on natural law to guide their interpretation of the statute,
thus suggesting that fundamental law-written or unwritten-does
serve as a constraint on the legislature. After concluding that retrospective laws were invalid, however, Pendleton merely stated that he
was "not obliged to give an opinion" on whether the judiciary might
void an invalid act, and then proceeded to give what appeared to be
an interpretation of the statute entirely unconstrained by any exter112. Id. at 280.
113. Id. at 282 (Fleming, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Fleming, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 284 (Lyons, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 283 (Lyons, J., concurring).
117. See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 17-18 (1782) (Pendleton, Pres.,
concurring).
118. Pendleton wrote an opinion in Turpin v. Locket invalidating a Virginia statute
requiring the sale of church lands, but he died the day before it was to be delivered. 10
Va. (6 Call) 113, 187 (1804); 2 DAVID J. MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721-1803: A
BIOGRAPHY 345 (1952).
119. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 285 (Pendleton, Pres., concurring).
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nal principles. 2 0 He thus again warmed his readers to the idea of
judicial review; he virtually announced that he would invalidate a
retrospective law; and he made it appear as if his interpretation of
the statute as prospective was forced only by the words of the statute
itself-thus proclaiming his intentions without having to act on
them even to the extent that Lyons and Fleming did. Nevertheless,
Pendleton's beliefs are clear: retrospective statutes are against natural justice and thus invalid. Pendleton further confirmed his adherence to the natural law tradition of his time by explaining the
relevance of the Contract Clause of the federal Constitution:
"although that [clause] is subsequent to the present act, I consider it
12
as declaring a principle which always existed."'
Pendleton's fidelity to unwritten law as a significant source of
higher law enforceable by the court was apparently carried on by his
immediate successor, St. George Tucker (although to somewhat different effect). Turpin v. Locket 122 was argued in 1803 and the decision was to be announced on October 26 of that year. Had events
not intervened, the court would have held three to one that a Virginia statute confiscating church glebe lands was unconstitutional.
Judge Pendleton had already written an opinion invalidating the
law, and Judges Carrington and Lyons agreed with him. 123 But
Judge Pendleton died the night before he was to deliver his opinion,
and Judge Tucker was appointed to replace him. The case was reargued and in 1804 Tucker's support of the law led to a tie vote, thus
24
affirming Chancellor Wythe's refusal to enjoin the confiscation.
Judge Roane found that the church had no vested right in the
property and voted to affirm.' 2 5 Judges Carrington and Lyons, in a
briefjoint opinion, found the confiscation law unconstitutional without much elaboration. 2 6 Judge Tucker, whose vote changed the
original outcome, delivered a detailed opinion examining the
church's rights in the property. 127 He found that the church lacked
any vested right in the property, and that earlier statutes awarding
church ministers the monies from glebe lands probably violated var128
ious specific sections of the written bill of rights.
120. Id. at 285-86 (Pendleton, Pres., concurring).
121. Id. at 285 (Pendleton, Pres., concurring).
122. 10 Va. (6 Call) at 187.
123. See supra note 118.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Turpin, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 186-87 (Carrington, J., and Lyons, Pres., dissenting).
Id. at 177-78 (RoaneJ., concurring).
Id at 186 (Carrington, J., and Lyons, Pres., dissenting).
Id. at 128-57.
Id. at 155-57.
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He also noted, however, that any incumbent ministers, whom he
later held did not exist, had acquired "a legal right" and also "a
moral right" to the enjoyment of their estates. 29 "So far as any act
of the legislature has operated for [the] purpose [of protecting those
rights]," he wrote, "it may be considered as pursuing the injunc' 30
tions of moral justice, and the first article of our bill of rights."'
Moreover, this was not an isolated reference to moral rights. Earlier
in his opinion, Judge Tucker set out the procedure for dealing with
conflicting state statutes: "If they cannot be reconciled to each
other, it will be our duty to pronounce those to be valid, which are
most easily reconcileable to the dictates of moral justice, and the
principles of the constitution of this commonwealth."''
Thus
Judge Tucker thrice coupled morality with positive law, suggesting
either that moral rights were an additional source of fundamental
law, or that the constitution necessarily reflected moral justice. Despite an apparent setback in the protection of what Pendleton might
have considered natural rights, at least some judges continued to
adhere to the doctrine of natural rights.
In two cases during this period, the Virginia court referred to natural law principles governing emigration. In both cases, the emigration question was peripheral, but the court's language was
nonetheless consistent with the unwritten rights analysis in the cases
discussed so far. In 1811 in Murray v. McCarty, the court held, following Grotius, that emigration "is one of those 'inherent rights, of
which, when [persons] enter into a state of society, they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or devest their posterity.' "132 The court expanded on this principle in 1829, in Hunter v. Fulcher, noting that
when a citizen of one state moves to another and subjects himself to
the latter's laws, he becomes a citizen of the latter "upon the princi1 33
ples of natural law, and the spirit of our institutions."
If the previously noted Remonstrance suggests that the Virginia
court was influenced by natural law as early as 1788, Crenshaw v. Slate
River Co. 134 demonstrates that the influence was still strong forty
years later. Plaintiffs, who claimed river rights under a 1726 state
grant, challenged an 1819 law requiring them to build and maintain
locks to make the river navigable.13 5 The court unanimously held
129. Id. at 152.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 150 (Tucker,J., concurring).
132. 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393, 397 (1811); see also id. at 405 (holding right of emigration is
"of paramount authority, bestowed on us by the God of Nature.").
133. 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172, 181 (1829).
134. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 265 (1828).
135. Id. at 246-48.
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that the plaintiffs held vested rights in their property, and that they
could not be deprived of those rights without compensation.13 6
Recall that the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which was still in
effect in 1828, contained no just compensation clause, and in fact
provided only that persons could not be "deprived of their property
for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected."' 137 Because the 1819 act was duly passed by
the Virginia legislature, that clause was of no avail. Judge Green,
with little elaboration, relied instead on Article 1 of the 1776 Bill of
Rights, which protected the rights of "possessing property" and
"enjoying liberty."'' 3 8 The other judges apparently relied on unwritten law.
Judge Carr stated that the principle of compensation was "laid
down by the writers on Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and
the Law of every civilized country." 139 Although he never discussed
the written constitution, he concluded that "whether we judge this
law by the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the Federal
Constitution, or that of our own State, it is unconstitutional and
void."' 40 Judge Coalter held that compensation was required, without citing any authority, whether written or unwritten.' 4' Judge
Cabell simply stated that he concurred with all the other judges.' 42
As in both the federal cases and the pre-1787 state cases, the Virginia courts did not depend entirely on unwritten natural law. In
1793, in Kamper v. Hawkins, the court relied exclusively on the written constitution to invalidate a statute giving district court judges
equitable jurisdiction and powers. 143 All five judges held that the
district judges had not been properly appointed to the chancery
court as required by the constitution, and thus that they could not
constitutionally exercise equitable jurisdiction.' 44 All of the opinions are conspicuously textualist.
Several judges examined minutely the portion of the written constitution setting out the frame of government. Judge Nelson and
Judge Tyler discussed judicial review in terms making clear that they
136. Id. at 264-65.
137. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 6, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 58, at 3813.
138. Crenshaw, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) at 276 (Green, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 265.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 283 (Coalter, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 284 (Cabell, J., concurring).
143. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 34-35 (1793).
144. Id.; id. at 42 (Roane, J., concurring); id. at 53 (Henry, J., concurring); id. at 64
(Tyler, J., concurring); id. at 97 (Tucker, J., concurring).
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envisioned the written constitution as the fundamental law animating judicial review of statutes.' 4 5 Judge Roane defined fundamental
principles as:
those great principles growing out of the Constitution, by the
aid of which, in dubious cases, the Constitution may be explained and preserved inviolate; those landmarks, which it may
be necessary to resort to, on account of the impossibility to
foresee or provide for46cases within the spirit, but not the letter
of the Constitution. 1
Judge Tucker distinguished pre-Revolutionary America from Virginia under its written constitution. In the former, "[w]hat the constitution of any country was or rather was supposed to be, could
only be collected from what the government had at any time
done." 47 In these more enlightened times, however, "the constitution is not 'an ideal thing, but a real existence: it can be produced in
living leta visible form:' its principles can be ascertained from' 4the
8
only.'
deduction
or
reasoning
obscure
from
not
ter,
Kamper, like the Virginia case of Commonwealth v. Caton 14 9 eleven
years earlier, raised a pure structure of government question. Individual rights were not at stake. As in Caton, the judges in Kamper
were surely aware of this: except for two offhand references to the
bill of rights, the only part of the written constitution on which the
judges relied was the structural portion, denominated "the constitution or form of government."' 5 0 This failure to import natural law
into a decision on the structure of government is consistent with the
pattern noted earlier. Unwritten law might define natural rights, but
the particular form of government depended primarily or exclusively on the written constitution.'15
The pattern in early republican Virginia is thus similar to the pattern in the pre-1787 state cases and in the federal cases at least up
through the 1820s. Except for some clear governmental powers decisions, judges and lawyers resorted to unwritten law as well as to
the written constitution. This provides some confirmation that unwritten law-including principles of natural justice-constituted an
145. Id. at 30-32, 61-62 (TylerJ., concurring).
146. Id. at 40 (Roane, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 78 (Tucker, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Tucker, J., concurring).
149. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
150. Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 24.
151. See also Case of the County Levy, 9 Va. (5 Call) 139, 142 (date unknown)
(interpreting the written text to allow courts as well as legislatures to assess levies to
support courthouses, prisons, and like causes). For a discussion of the use of the written
constitution primarily to resolve structure of government questions see Sherry, supra
note 1, at 1143-45, 1169, 1173-74.
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important source of the fundamental law by which positive enact52
ments might be measured.'
B.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, as amended, is still effective today. 153 It contains an extensive Declaration of Rights followed by a Frame of Government. 54 The Declaration of Rights
includes thirty separate articles, protecting everything from religious freedom to free elections to the right to instruct representatives. 15 5 Unlike the early Virginia constitution, the Massachusetts
Constitution explicitly provides for compensation when private
property is taken for public use (Article X), and prohibits ex post facto
criminal laws (Article XXIV).' 56 The very first article of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights reflects its natural law heritage: "All
men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and
57
inalienable rights."
Despite this extensive textual protection of individual rights, the
Massachusetts courts also resorted to unwritten natural law in many
cases. The most common constitutional question raised during the
early eighteenth century was the validity of various laws that the
challengers characterized as retrospective. Takings, whether compensated or not, do not appear to have figured prominently in early
152. Two cases involving fines suggest that the early Virginia courts subscribed to the
related idea that natural rights and written rights were coterminous. In Jones v.
Commonwealth, the court overturned the imposition ofjoint fines on several defendants.
5 Va. (1 Call) 554, 557 (1799). Judge Roane noted that the principle against joint fines
was "fortified not only by the principles of natural justice.... but, also, by the clause of
the Bill of Rights, prohibiting excessive fines." Id. at 556. Judge Carrington held that
the fines were invalid, "whether I consider the case upon principle, the doctrines of the
common law, or the spirit of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 559 (Carrington, J., concurring).
Judge Pendleton dissented, distinguishing the common law cases and not mentioning
the written constitution. Id. at 559-60 (Pendleton, Pres., dissenting). In Bullock v.
Goodall, two years later, however, Pendleton revealed his sympathy with his brethren's
equivalence of the written and unwritten law. 7 Va. (3 Call) 44, 50 (1801). In
overturning a fine, he wrote that it was "superlatively excessive, unconstitutional,
oppressive, and against conscience." Id. at 49.
153. The 1780 Constitution has been amended, and in 1916 it was "rearranged."
The SupremeJudicial Court, however, has held that any substantive changes in the 1916
rearrangement are ineffective: only the 1780 Constitution and its amendments are the
fundamental law of Massachusetts. Loring v. Young, 132 N.E. 65, 76 (Mass. 1921).
154. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pts. I, II, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTITtrIONS, supra note
58, at 1889, 1893.
155. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. I-XXX, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTIrrUIONS, supra

note 58, at 1889-93.
156. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, XXIV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTrrTIONS,
supra note 58, at 1891, 1892.
157. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTrTrrIONS, supra note 58, at
1889.
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Massachusetts legal history. Whether this is due to the explicit provision in the Massachusetts Constitution, or to the long-established
practice in that state of paying compensation, 5 8 we do not know.
Several textual or quasi-textual avenues were available to those
who challenged retrospective laws. The ex post facto clauses in both
the state and federal constitutions were often discussed; even
though the clauses were confined to criminal laws, lawyers and
judges might sometimes extend the principle to civil laws. The
Contract Clause of the United States Constitution' 59 was often held
to prohibit retrospective civil laws. In fact, in the Massachusetts
cases, most lawyers raised, and most judges considered, all of these
arguments. They also often considered natural rights arguments.
In 1799, in Derby v. Blake, '° the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court considered the validity of the same Georgia statute that was
eventually overturned by the United States Supreme Court in
Fletcher v. Peck.' 6 1 In the course of deciding an action on a promissory note used to purchase some of the disputed Georgia land, the
Massachusetts court held that the Georgia repealer statute was
void.' 62 The court apparently made its decision on the basis of both
written and unwritten law, and considered the unwritten law first.
The reporter stated that the court considered the repealer act "a
mere nullity-as a flagrant, outrageous violation of the first and fundamental principles of social compacts." 1 6 3 Presaging Justice Marshall's protestations, the court then noted that "[t]he vociferations
of the Georgia Legislature... about fraud and circumvention, could
not be admitted in a Judiciary of Massachusetts, as evidence of the real
158. See MORTON J. HORWlTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
63 (1977); William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 & n.5 (1985).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 8.
160. The case was not officially reported, but was described in a newspaper article
that was later published at 226 Mass. 618 (1917).
161. Id. at 621.
162. Id. at 624. According to the newspaper report, the jury found for the plaintiff,
who had argued that the Georgia law was void. Id. at 625. No reasons were given. Id. It
is not clear what the judges decided, as the newspaper report purportedly described
only the facts and the arguments of counsel. Id. at 622, 624-25. The description of the
plaintiff's argument, however, began: "But on the other hand, Mr. Lowell, for the
plaintiff contended, and was supported by the clear and decided opinion of the Court .... "
Id. at 624. Later in the plaintiff's argument the reporter noted that "[iut was also
decidedly the opinion of the Court that .... " Id. Finally, the reporter noted that "the
Court expressed a clear and decided opinion" that title passed with the original grant.
Id. at 624-25. In the text, I have described these passages by attributing them to the
court.
163. Id. at 624.
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existence of such facts." 164 Only then did the court turn to the textual basis for its decision, almost as an afterthought: "The Repealing Act of Georgia was moreover declared void, because it was
considered directly repugnant to Article 1st. Sec. 10, of the United
States Constitution ....
."165 Thus, despite its finding of a clear textual provision invalidating the statute at issue, the Massachusetts
court in 1799 relied in part-perhaps in greater part-on natural
66
law principles. 1
In 1815, in Portland Bank v. Apthorp, the Massachusetts court rejected a challenge to a retrospective law without very much detailed
67
discussion of either constitutional or natural law limitations.'
Most of the opinion involved an analysis of the constitutional provision granting the legislature power to impose general taxes, and
thus fits the pre-1789 pattern. Several statements in the opinion,
however, confirm the standing of unwritten natural rights as a limit
on legislative power.
The law challenged in Apthorp imposed a tax on banks and was
challenged by a bank whose charter pre-dated the statute. 168 Chief
Judge Parker described the court's task as determining whether the
statute conflicted with "the general principles, or any positive provisions of the constitution."'' 6 9 He concluded that it did not, but
rather that it was consistent "with that instrument, with the rights of
the corporation which complains, and with the usages and practise
of the country under the constitution."1 7 0 This tripartite measure of
conformity suggests both that the corporation's rights might be independent from those granted by the constitution, and that "usages
and practise" can determine the content of fundamental law. Both
these inferences are fully consistent with the cases and theories I
have already discussed.
The court's discussion of the significance of unbroken practice is
also interesting. After noting that it was "unsafe generally" to infer
governmental power from governmental practice, Judge Parker declared the inference valid "in questions touching the powers of government under a written constitution, not affecting the essential
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Derby may be explained partly on the ground that it involved a refusal to

enforce a foreign (non-Massachusetts) statute. Nevertheless, the case's natural law
language is suggestive.
167.
168.
169.
170.

12 Mass. 252, 258 (1815).
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
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rights of the citizen."' 7' Again, this strongly suggests that there are
rights beyond those listed in the written constitution, and also confirms the distinction noted earlier between governmental powers
questions and individual rights questions. The court ultimately concluded that in incorporating the bank and granting it a charter, the
legislature implicitly reserved future rights to tax the bank, and the
72
new law was thus not retrospective.
Judge Parker reached a similar conclusion with regard to another
banking statute four years later in Foster v. Essex Bank.17 3 The statute
challenged in Foster required banks and other corporations to continue in corporate status for three years after the expiration of their
charters, to wind up business and prosecute and defend suits.' 74 As
in Apthorp, it was challenged as retrospective by a bank whose charter pre-dated the act.' 75 The court upheld the statute on the ground
that it was "not retrospective in the proper sense of that term," because it did not "infringe or interfere with any of the privileges se76
cured by the charter."'
Before reaching that conclusion, however, Judge Parker indulged
in a long dissertation on the nature of fundamental law. He began
by stating the basic principle ofjudicial review, that laws that "manifestly infringe some of the provisions of the constitution, or violate
the rights of the subject" must be invalidated by the judiciary.177 As
an example of the first type of statute, he cited a legislative declaration that a citizen was guilty of treason. 7 8 The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (article XXV) specifically provides that "no
subject ought, in any case, or in any time, to be declared guilty of
79
treason or felony by the legislature." 1
Judge Parker's second amplification of the basic principle ofjudicial review is more interesting for our purposes. He described acts
"destroy[ing] or impair[ing] the legal force of contracts" by discharging debtors or allowing them to pay a lesser or different
amount.' 8 0 "[S]uch acts," he continued, "would be unconstitu171. Id. at 257.
172. Id. at 258.
173. 16 Mass. 245, 274 (1819).
174. Id. at 246.
175. Id. at 247.
176. Id. at 272-73.
177. Id. at 270.
178. Id.
179. MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXV, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTIrUTIONS, supra
note 58, at 1892. Judge Parker in fact did not cite this or any other written
constitutional provision, but the congruence between his hypothetical and article XXV is
too striking to admit any other conclusion. See Foster, 16 Mass. at 270.
180. Foster, 16 Mass. at 270-71.
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tional, although not expressly prohibited; because, by the fundamental principles of legislation, the law must operate prospectively
only."' 8 ' He thus illustrated the difference between the two types of
invalid statutes described at the beginning of his opinion: those inconsistent with the written constitution, and those inconsistent with
unwritten fundamental principles. Both types were to be invalidated by the judiciary.
An examination of counsel's arguments in Foster further confirms
the common use of natural law during this period. Counsel for the
bank argued that "[r]etrospective laws are repugnant to natural justice." 18s 2 Counsel for the plaintiff suggested the particularized nature of natural law: "different societies of men, where the written
constitution is silent, will have more or fewer implied exceptions to
the general principle, according to the habits, laws, and usages,
which they may have derived from their ancestors." 8 3 He argued a
little later that limitations on the power of enacting retrospective
laws "must be learned from the habits and principles of the particular people who compose any such community."' 8 4
The early history of Massachusetts decisions on retrospective laws
thus provides evidence that even in states with a written bill of
rights, the court frequently turned to unwritten law as well. Two
other cases during this period, not involving retrospective laws, also
exhibited a reliance on natural law.
Holden v. James, decided in 1814, invalidated a statute purporting
to extend the statute of limitations in a particular case only.' 8 5
Judge Jackson decided that although the written constitution gave
the legislature the power to suspend laws, the provision was originally meant as a limitation on royal power, and therefore should not
be interpreted "to bestow, by implication, on the general court one
of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings
of England."1 86
Having disposed of the argument that the written constitution
specifically authorized the law in question, Judge Jackson turned to
whether the law was prohibited. He did not even look at the written
bill of rights, although it contained an arguably relevant provision
(Article VI) that prohibited the granting of "particular and exclusive
privileges." Instead he wrote: "It is manifestly contrary to the first
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
11
Id.

at 271.
at 252.
at 257.
at 262.
Mass. 396, 406 (1814).
at 404-05.
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principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges
and advantages, which are denied to all others under like circumstances. '"187 He therefore held the plaintiff's suit was barred under
the ordinary statute of limitations.' 8 8
In the 1817 case of Wetherbee v. Johnson, customs officers who had
lost a trespass action against them in the state trial court attempted
to appeal to the United States Circuit Court under a federal statute
authorizing such appeals in cases involving customs officers.'8 9 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the right of appeal,
on textual grounds, although counsel opposing the appeal had
made both textual and natural law arguments. 90
Counsel argued that the federal statute violated the United States
Constitution in two particulars: the case was beyond the scope of
federal jurisdiction as specified in Article III, and the appeal would
allow a fact tried to a jury to be re-examined in contravention to the
Seventh Amendment.' 9 ' He also argued, however, that the statute
"interfere[d] with the private rights of citizens," and was "in derogation of the common rights of the citizens."' 19 2 Chief Judge
Parker's opinion for the court rested on yet another ground: that
the distinctions set up in Article III between the Supreme Court and
inferior courts meant that "none but the Supreme Court of the
United States could entertain jurisdiction by way of appeal, from the
judgments of the state courts."' 193 Wetherbee thus offers only very
tentative support for the use of natural law principles during the
period, but counsel's argument is at least suggestive. 19 4
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
14 Mass. 412, 413 (1817).
Id. at 421. Why the Massachusetts court had jurisdiction over the issue was

unclear.

191. Id. at 413-14.
192. Id. at 414.
193. Id. at 419.
194. Wetherbee is also interesting for the light it sheds on a contemporaneous legal
dispute. Judge Parker noted that the federal statute provided two alternative methods of
bringing federal questions before the federal courts: removal to a circuit court from
state court, or appeal to the United States Supreme Court after judgment in the state
court. Id. at 416-17. The first alternative, he stated, was constitutional, and would have
saved "much doubt and difficulty" had it been the only method. Id. at 417. As to the
appeal to the Supreme Court, however, he noted that it "has been a question of much
doubt and argument: and the power claimed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, under this section of the law, has been denied by the highest court of law in
Virginia." Id. Although he concluded that it was unnecessary for him to decide "whether
the court of the United States, or the court of Virginia, are right on this important
question," he devoted a short paragraph to justifying the actions of the Virginia court.
Id. at 417-18.
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During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Massachusetts court also decided two retrospectivity cases without looking
to unwritten law. In Call v. Hagger in 1812, the court held that a
retrospective shortening of the statute of limitations would not violate the Contract Clause of the federal Constitution, although for
unspecified reasons it construed the statute at issue as purely prospective in nature. 95 The one page opinion contained no reference
to natural law, and virtually no textual analysis. In Blanchardv. Russell in 1816, the court held that a retrospective insolvency law would
violate the Contract Clause, but concluded that the statute at issue
19 6
was enacted prior to the debt arising between the parties.
In both cases, the interpretation of either the facts or the statute
eliminated the need to reach the question of the validity of the statute, although in both cases the court did So.1 9 7 There is no indication in either opinion-contrary to the tenor of many of the
contemporaneous cases-that the court felt constrained to construe
the statute so as to make it constitutional. The tone of the opinion
in each case suggests that the dictum was almost a boilerplate acknowledgement of counsel's constitutional arguments, without any
real sympathy for the principles. 9 8 Even if these two cases represent a purely textualist approach, moreover, it is clear from the examination of the other cases that as late as 1819, the use of natural
law was at least as common in Massachusetts as the use of pure textualism-and probably more so. 199
Indeed, Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw apparently adhered to natural law principles as late as 1827, when he delivered a
speech to the Suffolk County Bar. In that speech, he noted that "no
law can stand the test of strict inquiry which palpably violates the
dictates of natural justice."2 0 0 He also explained the unique nature
of constitutional law-"a title hardly known in any other system of
195. 8 Mass. 423, 430 (1812).
196. 13 Mass. 1, 15-17 (1816).

197. Blanchard, 13 Mass. at 16; Call, 8 Mass. at 430.
198. Blanchard, 13 Mass. at 12-13; Call, 8 Mass. at 430.
199. Between 1813 and 1817, the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court also decided
a series of cases interpreting the constitutional language regarding qualifications of
electors. See Bridge v. Lincoln, 14 Mass. 367, 372-74 (1817); Williams v. Whiting, 11
Mass. 424, 432-35 (1814); Putnam v.Johnson, 10 Mass. 488, 502 (1813). In those cases,
the real issue was whether the social compact granted to particular individuals the right
to vote. Bridge, 14 Mass. at 372-73; Williams, 11 Mass. at 432-35; Putnam, 10 Mass. at
502. Thus, the court used common law principles to elucidate the meaning of the
constitutional language, but did not refer to natural law. See CHILTON WILLIAMSON,
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 168, 198 (1960).
200. Lemuel Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States, 7 AM. JURIST & L. 56, 68
(1932).
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jurisprudence"-as involving questions of "the principles of social
duty [and] of natural and conventional obligation" and requiring "a
thorough and intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of the
mind." 20 This suggests that one of the most influential jurists in
Massachusetts thought that judges ought to look beyond the written
constitution when determining the validity of legislative enactments,
and confirms the pervasiveness of natural law ideas.
C.

New York

The earliest New York constitution lacked a separate bill of
rights.2 0 2 Indeed, the 1777 New York Constitution accorded individual rights very little protection. The 1777 New York Constitution, in effect until 1821, contained a "law of the land" clause, but
one that was quite limited: it protected only against disenfranchisement or deprivation of "the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of this State by this constitution." 2' 0 3 The rights actually
secured by the constitution were also limited: there was a provision
guaranteeing jury trials and prohibiting bills of attainder,2 0 4 and a
religious toleration clause.2 0 5 These minimal individual rights pro20 6
visions were fully integrated into the body of the constitution.
The reason for New York's failure to include a detailed bill of rights
was similar to the objections raised against a federal bill of rights:
according to a New York court, "[tihe enumeration was designedly
omitted, because unnecessary, and tending to weaken, if not endan20 7
ger those unnoticed."
In 1821, New York enacted a new constitution. Better organized
and more detailed than the 1777 Constitution, the new constitution
also afforded greater protection of individual rights. Criminal defendants gained many of the rights listed in the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 20 8 Suspension of habeas corpus was
201. Id. at 64.

202. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 58, at 262338.
203. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § XIII, reprintedin 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 58, at
2632.
204. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § XLI, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 58, at
2637.
205. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § XXXVIII, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTTrrUTIONS, supra note
58, at 2636-37.
206. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 58, at 2632,
2636-37.
207. People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
208. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 7, reprinted in 5 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
58, at 2648.
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prohibited except where necessary because of rebellion. 20 9 A provision guaranteeing freedom of speech was added.2 10 Finally, and
most important, the 1821 New York Constitution provided that
"[no person shall be] deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." 2 '1 Thus, it was not until 1821 that
New York's written constitution required compensation for public
takings. Moreover, the limited nature of New York's "law of the
land" clause suggests that there was no written protection of private
property at all until 1821.
As in other states, however, the New York courts used unwritten
natural law to protect individual rights--especially property rightsfrom state infringement. In particular, a series of three cases established compensation for the taking of private property as an unwritten right, enforceable despite the absence of a written constitutional
provision.
In 1816, Chancellor James Kent used the eighteenth century language of natural rights and fundamental principles to prohibit the
village of Newburgh from diverting a stream without paying compensation to a downstream owner.2 12 The Chancellor held, in Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, that "to render the exercise of the power
[to take private property for public purposes] valid, a fair compensation must, in all cases, be previously made to the individuals affected." 2 1 3 Because no constitutional or statutory provision
supported this principle, Kent cited Grotius, Pufendorf, "natural equity," and the "deep and universal sense of [the principle's] justice,"
which led "all temperate and civilized governments" to adopt it.214
To deprive an owner of his property without compensation, he said,
"would be unjust, and contrary to the first principles of government." 21 5 The absence of written protection of this fundamental
right did not, for Kent, make it any less fundamental or enforceable.
209. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 6, reprinted in 5
58, at 2648.
210. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 8, reprinted in 5
58, at 2648.
211. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 7, reprinted in 5
58, at 2648.
212. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note

162, 167-68 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). In
his 1826 Commentaries, Kent similarly noted that certain rights (including the right to
enjoy property) "have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the people of
this country, to be natural, inherent, and inalienable." 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 1 (Charles M. Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884).
213. Gardner, 2 Johns. Ch. at 166.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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The relationship between written and unwritten fundamental law
is also illustrated by Kent's use of other written constitutions as evidence for the necessity of the principle of compensation. He noted
that the principle of compensation "has frequently been made the
subject of an express and fundamental article of right in the constitution of governments," citing the constitutions of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Delaware, and the United States. 2 16 The presence of a compensation provision in the United States Constitution, he reasoned,
was "absolutely decisive of the sense of the people of this country." 21 7 Kent's failure to make any distinction between those state
constitutions and his own strongly suggests both that written and
unwritten fundamental law are of equal stature, and that written
bills of rights were mere codifications or declarations of inherent
rights that exist independent of their inclusion in the written document. His reliance on the United States Constitution as "decisive of
the sense of the people" further suggests that natural rights are to
some extent customary and evolving. These inferences from Kent's
reasoning are consistent with the late eighteenth century view of
natural law, and suggest that in New York, at least, it extended well
into the nineteenth century.
That conclusion is reinforced by two cases decided in the 1820s.
Moreover, although Gardner was a case in equity, the two following
cases were at law, which demonstrates that the concept of enforceable natural rights was not simply an equitable notion.
In Bradshaw v. Rodgers, a New York intermediate appellate court
judge made explicit the reliance on non-binding written law as declaratory of unwritten fundamental law. 2 18 In Bradshaw, an 1822
case, the plaintiff's land had been taken as part of a canal-building
project.2 1 9 Chief Justice Spencer of the New York Supreme Court
held that the taking was unauthorized by statute, and also that the
land could not be taken without compensation. 220 He cited the
United States Constitution and the 1821 New York Constitution in
support of his insistence on compensation, but denied reliance on
either: "The former related to the powers of the national government, and was intended as a restraint on that government; and the
latter is not yet operative." 2 2 1 He used them, he said, because "they
216.
217.
218.
1823).
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 167.
Id.
20Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), rev'd on other grounds, 20Johns. 735 (N.Y.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
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are both declaratory of a great and fundamental principle of government; and any law violating that principle must be deemed a nullity,
as it is against natural right and justice." 22 2 A clearer statement of
the early nineteenth century relationship between written and un2
written rights would be hard to find. 23
2 24
After 1822, the 1821 Constitution guaranteed compensation,
but that did not prevent the New York courts from relying on unwritten law as well. As late as 1827, in Coates v. The Mayor, a New
York appellate court slighted counsel's reliance on the compensation clause of the 1821 Constitution and turned in addition to natural law. 22 5 In Coates, plaintiffs challenged an 1823 New York City
ordinance prohibiting cemeteries from the southernmost part of the
city. 2 26 Plaintiffs had operated the Trinity Church cemetery-located within the prohibited area-since 1697, when the King had
granted letters patent conferring a perpetual right to operate the
22 7
church-yard and cemetery.
The plaintiffs argued that the recently enacted ordinance inter228
fered with the vested rights granted by the 1697 letters patent.
They thus contended that the ordinance violated the Contracts
Clause of the federal Constitution, and the Just Compensation
Clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.2 2 9 Almost as an
afterthought, they also contended that "[t]he most celebrated writers" agree "that such a measure is contrary to the fundamental principles of civil society." 2 3 0 Defendants challenged plaintiffs'
222. Id.
223. The New York Court for the Correction of Errors reversed the lower court's

statutory interpretation, holding that a state statute authorized the taking and provided
compensation. Rodgers v. Bradshaw, 20Johns. 735, 740-41 (N.Y. 1823). There was no
discussion in the appellate court of the constitutional issue. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20
Johns. 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
224. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 7, reprinted in5 STATE CoNsTrruToNs, supra note
58, at 2648.
225. 7 Cow. 585, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
226. Id. at 585-87.
227. Id. at 586.
228. Id. at 588-89.
229. Id. at 590.
230. Id. The plaintiffs also argued that the state statute conferring authority on the
city to regulate cemeteries required a finding of public necessity before cemeteries could
be prohibited. Id. at 588. Defendants responded that the word "necessary" in the
authorizing statute was "synonymous with convenient or useful." Id. at 589. They cited
5 Wheat. 413 in support of that argument, illustrating either the unreliability of lawyers'
citations (or reporters' printing) or the inaccessibility of reporters. The case at 5 Wheat.
413 (United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412 (1820)) is a completely irrelevant maritime
case. Defendants apparently meant to cite 4 Wheat. 413 (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 (1819)).
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interpretation of the constitutional clauses at issue, and did not
23
mention natural law. '
The court found for the defendants, upholding the city ordinance. 23 2 The most interesting aspect of the decision, however, is
that the court apparently felt that conformity with the written constitution was insufficient to validate the law. The court held that "this
by-law is not void, either as being unconstitutional, or as conflicting
with what we acknowledge as a fundamental principle of civilized
society, that private property shall not be taken even for public use,
without just compensation.- 2 33 No citation followed. The reference to fundamental principles seems totally unnecessary, as the
written constitution then in effect guaranteed the same right of just
compensation. The combination of the apparently unnecessary reference, the use of the disjunctive, and the placement of the comma
after "unconstitutional" together suggest that the court might have
felt itself bound to test laws for their conformity with unwritten natural law as well as with the written constitution. Thus, the court
apparently believed that a conflict with a "fundamental principle of
civilized society" might void an otherwise constitutional law.
Similarly, in In re Albany Street in 1834, the New York Supreme
23 4
Court limited the takings power to takings for public purposes.
Any other reading of the 1821 compensation clause, the court declared, "is in violation of natural rights, and if it is not in violation of
the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be
supported."235
The requirement of just compensation was not the only judicially
enforceable natural right in New York. Dash v. Van Kleeck, an 1811
case at law, involved a change in the statutory law governing the
236
liability of law enforcement officers for the escape of a prisoner.
The court held that a law enacted after an escape could not be ap23 7
plied to limit the plaintiff's recovery for the escape.
Chancellor Kent wrote the most careful opinion. He noted that
applying the later law could only be accomplished in one of two
ways: by applying the law retrospectively, or by construing it as a
new interpretation of the old statute.2 3 8 He concluded easily that
231. Coates, 7 Cow. at 592. Defendants argued that "a mere regulation," as opposed
to a physical taking, neither required compensation nor impaired any contract. Id.
232. Id. at 607-08.
233. Id. at 606.
234. 11 Wend. 150, 151-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
235. Id. at 151.
236. 7 Johns. 477, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
237. Id. at 513.
238. Id. at 501 (Kent, CJ., concurring).
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the latter would violate the constitution by conflating the legislative
23 9
and judicial branches.
In denying that a civil law might be retrospectively applied, however, the Chancellor had a problem. The 1777 New York Constitution did not prohibit ex post facto laws, and the prohibition against
them in the United States Constitution had recently and authoritatively been interpreted as limited to criminal laws. 240 Kent met the
challenge head on, admitting that "[i]t is not pretended that we have
any express constitutional provision on this subject." 24 , He noted
that although "numerous other rights dear alike to freedom and justice" were unprotected by the written constitution, the courts were
nevertheless constrained to follow "justice" and "fundamental principles." 2 42 Rather than invalidate the statute before him, however,
he interpreted it to apply only prospectively. 243 He tacitly admitted
that such an interpretation was essentially a fiction to allow him to
uphold the statute, noting that "the courts were bound to give such
a construction to a statute as was consistent with justice, though
contrary to the letter of it."244
Two of the four other judges apparently agreed with the Chancellor's use of unwritten law. Thompson examined the statute's language carefully to conclude that it was not meant to apply
retrospectively, but also noted that any other construction would be
"repugnant to the first principles of justice, and the equal and permanent security of rights. '2 45 Van Ness agreed with Kent without
24 6
opinion.
The other two judges, who constituted a minority in favor of denying liability, did not specifically deny that natural law might invalidate a statute, and it is possible to read their opinions as
sidestepping the question. Yates, in a very short opinion, ignored
239. Id. (Kent, CJ., concurring). Interestingly, he reached this conclusion through a
very non-literalist interpretative method. He noted that several constitutions, including
those of Massachusetts and Virginia, explicitly prohibited the mingling of powers among
the branches. Id. at 508 (Kent, C.J., concurring). He then continued: -[I]f it be not
found in our own constitution, in terms, it exists there in substance; in the organization
and distribution of the powers of the departments, and in the declaration that the
.supreme legislative power' shall be vested in the senate and assembly." Id. at 509 (Kent,
C.J., concurring).
240. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 400 (1798). Calder, of course, was itself based
as much on natural law principles as on the written constitution. See Sherry, supra note 1,
at 1172-73.
241. Dash, 7Johns. at 505 (Kent, CJ., concurring).
242. Id. (Kent, C.J., concurring).
243. Id. at 509 (Kent, C.J. concurring).
244. Id. at 502 (Kent, C.J., concurring).
245. Id. at 493-94 (Thompson, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 513 (Van Ness, J., concurring).
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natural law and concluded that because nothing in either the state
24 7
or federal constitutions prohibited the new statute, it was valid.
He specifically noted, however, that he did not need to consider
whether a retroactive statute would be valid, because the statute at
issue was simply a reinterpretation of a pre-existing statute, which
had been incorrectly construed by the judiciary.2 48 Thus, the new
statute simply confirmed the legislative meaning of the older statute, and, according to Yates, was the only true meaning of the older
statute. 24 9 Spencer stated that he agreed with Yates, but he too specifically relied on the new statute as a reinterpretation of the older
statute and thus did not reach the ex postfacto question which so lent
2 50
itself to a natural law analysis.
During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, then, the
New York courts, like the courts of other states, were protecting unwritten rights. At the same time, however, they were also deciding
some cases on purely textual grounds. In three cases prior to Bradshaw v. Rodgers, Chief Justice Spencer-who wrote the heavily nontextualist opinion in Bradshaw-relied exclusively on textual provisions. These cases might be puzzling were it not for peculiar circumstances in each of the cases.
The easiest of the three to explain is People v. Platt, an 1819 case
involving a state law that prohibited dams obstructing salmon from
running upstream. 25 t Prior to the passage of the statute, the state
had granted to the defendant full title to a portion of the Saranac
River and the land on both banks, subject only to reservation of
mining and navigation rights.2 52 The river turned out not to be navigable, and the defendant then proceeded to build a dam across
247. Id. at 483-84 (Yates, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 483 (Yates, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Yates, J., dissenting). This reasoning, of course, still raises retrospectivity
questions, but Yates apparently did not see them.
250. Id. at 488-89, 492-93 (Spencer, J., dissenting). Spencer's analysis of whether the
legislature had power to alter the construction of the laws was aided by what he
characterized as the existence of conflicting U.S. Supreme Court decisions, "if we may
confide in the accuracy of the reporters who have published the decisions of that court."
Id. at 491 (Spencer, J., dissenting). Again, the accessibility of lawyers and judges to
opinions of other courts seemed minimal. In some cases, the judges could not even
locate prior decisions of their own court. In the 1820 South Carolina case of Singleton v.
Commissioners, Justice Huger lamented that he had been "unable to find the decision
referred to [by counsel], from the difficulty of searching the massy [messy? massive?]
volumes of manuscript reports, in which all the decisions of this court, prior to 1818, are
buried, and from which they may never arise, unless aided by a regularly appointed
reporter." 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 526, 528 (1820). For a discussion of Singleton, see
infra notes 296-298 and accompanying text.
251. 17Johns. 195, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
252. Id. at 197.
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Without the dam, the property would have been useless to the
defendant. The court thus easily held, on the authority of Fletcher v.
Peck, that the later-enacted statute purporting to regulate the dam
could not pass muster under the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution. 25 4 No recourse to natural law was necessary to
find for the defendant.2 5 5 In Coates, the court looked to natural law
before it upheld a statute,2 56 suggesting that it might have reached a
different result if the written constitution and the unwritten law conflicted. In Platt, any reference to natural law would simply have
been an alternative ground for the same decision, and thus the failure to consider unwritten law suggests at best that written law was
preferable where it mirrored unwritten law.2 57 The fact that Judge
Spencer cited Platt in Bradshaw, as "somewhat illustrat[ing]" the "all
important and essential principle" against takings without compensation, 2 58 further suggests that Spencer's failure to use natural law
in Platt was not significant. Like the South Carolina case of White v.
Kendrick, 25 9 Platt neither supports nor undermines the proposition
that state courts enforced unwritten rights.
Another 1819 Contracts Clause decision by Spencer is somewhat
more difficult to reconcile with the natural law emphasis in Bradshaw
and the other cases. In Mather v. Bush, Spencer held that an 1811
New York insolvency statute could be used to discharge an 1816
contract, notwithstanding the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution. 260 Again, it was an easy case for a textualist: because
the insolvency law pre-dated the contract, and because contracts
necessarily incorporate the law of the jurisdiction, the court held
that the insolvency law was part of the contract itself and thus could
not be deemed to impair it.26I Justice Spencer's failure to measure
the law against natural rights principles as well as against the written
constitution-as the court did in upholding the statute in Coates-is
253. Id.
254. Id. at 215.
255. As in several of the other cases of this era, the court in fact interpreted the
statute to exempt the defendant rather than invalidating it. Id.
256. 7 Cow. 585, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
257. Another explanation might be that the United States Constitution was
considered a higher source of authority than both the written and unwritten law of New
York. That does not explain why in both Bradshaw and Dash the courts did not discuss
whether the limited nature of federal constitutional protection preempted state natural
law. The explanation suggested in the text is more consistent with those cases.
258. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (citing Platt, 117
Johns. at 215).
259. 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 469 (1805); see infra note 340 and accompanying text.
260. 16Johns. 233, 251-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
261. Id. at 252-53.
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somewhat puzzling, however. Perhaps it may be explained by the
obviousness of the result; it would be a strange natural right indeed
that allowed a party to enter into an illegal contract and then claim
that the contract invalidated the law. Moreover, none of the formidable eighteenth century inalienable rights--of conscience, of jury
trial, of security of private property, or of reliance on reasonable
and non-arbitrary laws-were involved in the case.
The final purely textualist New York case of the period was People
v. Foot,2 62 decided in 1821. In that case, Chief Justice Spencer held
that the state legislature could not direct the council of appointment
(a body created by the state constitution) to accept or reject the resignation of a county commissioner. 263 The 1777 Constitution gave
the council discretion in appointing and terminating most state officers, and "It]he legislature, therefore, cannot prescribe to the
council the mode or manner of executing the constitutional trust
reposed in them." 2 64 There are two possible explanations for Spencer's reliance on purely textual analysis. First, as in Plait, natural law
principles would not have altered the result (which involved the liability of a former commissioner). Moreover, as I noted in the first
section of this paper, the other early cases reveal a pattern in which
text is more important in structure of government cases and unwritten law is more important in individual rights cases. Foot is clearly a
case in the former category, and the reliance on text is thus
unsurprising.
In New York, the ultimate rejection of extra-textualism came in
1856 in Wynehamer v. People. Judge Comstock, sitting on New York's
highest bench, cited several early cases as authority for the proposition that "laws which, although not specially prohibited by written
constitutions, are repugnant to reason, and subvert clearly vested
rights, are invalid, and must be declared so by the judiciary."2 65 He
nevertheless limited his consideration to the written constitution, on
the ground that early jurists were insufficiently aware of the dangers
of extra-textual judicial review:
[T]he danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theories, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable
rights, but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government, attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and
when too much reverence for government and law is certainly
262. 19 Johns. 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).

263. Id. at 59.
264. Id.
265. 13 N.Y. 378, 390 (1856).
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among the least of the perils to which our institutions are
2 66
exposed.
Implicit in this rejection of natural rights is a very modem notion
that the government should not be overly restricted by limits not
explicitly set out in the Constitution. Nevertheless, Comstock's
opinion confirms the prevalence of natural law concepts during the
first few decades of the nineteenth century.
D.

South Carolina

South Carolina drafted three different constitutions before
1800.267 None had a separate bill of rights, but each provided
greater protection for individual rights than the last. The 1776
Constitution, designed to be temporary, included only structural
provisions necessary to implement a new and independent government.2 6 8 In 1778, that first effort was replaced by a constitution that
integrated structural provisions with minimal protection of individual rights. Both some religious toleration 2 69 and liberty of the
press 270 were mandated, although the 1778 Constitution also established Protestantism as the state religion. The only other protection
of individual rights in the 1778 Constitution was a version of a
clause found in many state constitutions of the period: a "law of the
land" clause, derived from the Magna Carta: "That no freeman of
this State be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, exiled or in any manner destroyed
or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land." 2 7 1 As we shall see, "law of the
land" was a rather ambiguous phrase, but was most commonly interpreted to protect ancient and traditional rights. The clause is of
particular contemporary relevance because "law of the land" may be
2 72
a direct predecessor of "due process of law."
266. Id. at 391-92.
267. South Carolina did not rewrite its Constitution again until the beginning of the
Civil War (and then did so again after the war). Several amendments were added in the
first half of the nineteenth century, but all dealt with structural matters.
268. S.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTTrrUIONS, supra note 58, at 3241-

48.
269. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprintedin 6 STATE CoNsTITtrrIoNs, supra note

58, at 3255-57.
270. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLIII, reprinted in 6 STATE CoNsTrrrIoNs, supra note
58, at 3257.
271. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XLI, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTTrrUIoNs, supra note 58,

at 3257.
272. See Zylstra v. Corporationof Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 391 (1794) (citing Coke
as equating "law of the land" with "due process of law"); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-72 (1985); Frank R. Strong, Law of the Land, in 3
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The 1790 Constitution retained the "law of the land" clause (as
well as the press and religion clauses), and added to it prohibitions
against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. Obviously heavily influenced by the federal
Bill of Rights, which the South Carolina legislature had just voted to
ratify, 273 the 1790 Constitution also prohibited "cruel punishments," "excessive" bail or fines, and titles of nobility.2 74 Trial by
jury "as heretofore used in this State" was to be inviolably preserved. 2 75 It is important to note that the 1790 Constitution did not
contain any requirement of compensation for the taking of private
land for public purposes.
The structure of the 1790 Constitution mimicked that of the federal Constitution, but only as to governmental powers provisions.
Unlike the earlier constitutions, whose organization was rather haphazard, the 1790 Constitution was divided into logically coherent
articles. Articles I through III were devoted to the legislature, executive, and judiciary respectively. 2 76 Several miscellaneous structural
articles followed, then an article devoted solely to religious freedom, an article containing all of the other individual rights, a further
structural article, and finally an article setting out the process for
amendments. 2 7 7 Thus, unlike Massachusetts or Virginia, South Carolina during this period lacked a bill of rights separate and distinct
from the rest of its constitution.
As might be expected in a growing state, many of the early constitutional cases in South Carolina involved the taking of private property, usually for road building. In almost all of the cases, either the
lawyers or the judges or both relied wholly or partly on unwritten
natural law. In two cases, the written constitution was not mentioned at all, and the arguments and decisions rested solely on unwritten law. 2 78 In two more cases, the grounds for the decision were
1130-31 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds.,
1990); J.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L.
REV. 67, 81-83 (1931); Riggs, supra note 19, at 947. Professor Riggs uses historical
evidence to link "law of the land" clauses with substantive due process, a notion that in
practice is clearly kindred to natural or unwritten rights. Id. at 958.
273. South Carolina voted to ratify the Bill of Rights on January 19, 1790. The 1790
Constitution was framed and adopted by a convention that completed its work on June
3, 1790.
274. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
58, at 3264.
275. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 5, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
58, at 3264.
276. S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprinted in 6 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 58, at 325869.
277. Id. at 3258-63.
278. See infra notes 282-95 and accompanying text.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
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unclear, but strong language in the opinions suggests the validity of
unwritten law as a basis for protecting individual rights. 2 79 In three
cases, unwritten law was imported into the written constitution by
the "law of the land" clause.2 80 In only one case-one of only two
involving trial by jury rather than property rights-did the South
Carolina Constitutional Court rely solely on the written constitution
28
itself. '
The judicial enforceability of natural law in South Carolina is best
illustrated by two early cases. Ham v. M'Claws, in 1789, involved a
statute that restricted the importation of slaves to citizens of sister
states.2 8 2 The plaintiffs in Ham were British citizens in Honduras
2 83
who brought their slaves with them to settle in South Carolina.
After they set sail for South Carolina, but before they arrived, the
South Carolina legislature changed the law regarding slave importation. 28 4 Whereas prior law allowed all settlers to bring into the state

their own personal slaves, the new law restricted importation privileges to citizens of the United States, resident within the country on
the day the new statute was ratified. 28 5 The statute itself contained
no other exceptions to the ban on importation.2 8 6 Nevertheless, the
court interpreted the new law to exempt slaves in transit at the time
2 87
of its passage.
Thus, the court construed the statute against its obvious import to
make it consistent with what the court (and plaintiffs' counsel) labelled "common right," "common reason," and "justice, and the
dictates of natural reason." The court noted that any statute incon279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See infra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 299-339 and accompanying text.
See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (1789).
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94-95. The reporter quoted the 1788 statute as follows:
That no negro or other slave shall be imported or brought into this state,
either by land or water, on or before the first day ofJanuary, A.D. 1793,
under the penalty of forfeiting every such slave or slaves, to any person
who will sue or inform for the same; and under the further penalty of
paying 100 1. to the use of the state, for every such negro or slave so
imported or brought in. Provided, that nothing in this prohibition
contained, shall extend to such slave, as are now the property of citizens
of the United States, and at the time of passing this act shall be within the
limits of the United States.
Id. at 94.
287. Id. The court construed the statute--despite clear language to the contrary-not
to apply to those who brought slaves into South Carolina "under the sanction of a
former act, before it was possible for the party apprized of the subsequent one." Id. at
97.
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sistent with those principles was "absolutely null and void," and
thus held itself bound to construe the statute in a way that was "contrary to the strict letter of the law" but consistent with natural reason. 288 No mention was made of the 1778 Constitution then in
force, by either the lawyers or the court.
In fact, the court might have found it difficult to interpret the "law
of the land" clause to protect the plaintiffs in Ham. Because the
plaintiffs were not citizens of South Carolina, it is not clear whether
they were protected by the "law of the land" clause, which applied
only to "free[men] of this State." Moreover, it is doubtful whether a
right to bring property into the state would have been considered
liberty or property protected by the clause. Thus, not only did the
court's decision in favor of the plaintiff rest squarely on unwritten
law, it probably could not have rested on the written constitution.
Three years later, in Bowman v. Middleton, the court went further
2 89
and actually invalidated a statute on the basis of unwritten law.
Bowman involved a 1712 act transferring property from one owner
to another.2 90 The defendant had agreed to purchase from the
plaintiffs a tract of land inherited from the beneficiary of the 1712
act. 2 9 1 The purchaser refused to close the contract, arguing that
some of this land was in fact not the plaintiffs' to sell, but belonged
instead to the heirs of the original owner. 29 2 The plaintiffs interposed the 1712 act as legally conferring title on them. 293 The court
ruled for the defendant, holding the 1712 act void on the ground
that "it was against common right, as well as against magna charta, to
take away the freehold of one man and vest it in another." 29 4 Again,
neither counsel nor the court mentioned the new 1790 Constitution,
although in this case the "law of the land" clause was almost certainly applicable since an owner had been deprived of his
freehold.295
288. Id. The reporter similarly described the case as standing for the propositions
that "[s]tatutes against the plain and obvious principles of common right and common
reason, are null and void," and "Judges are bound to give such a construction to acts of
the legislature, as is consistent with the justice and the dictates of natural reason,
although contrary to the letter of the law." Id. at 93.
289. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252, 254-55 (1792).
290. Id. at 253-54.
291. Id. at 252-54.
292. Id. at 252.
293. Id. at 252-54.
294. Id. at 254-55.
295. Id. at 252-55. The court's citation of magna charta further confirms the likelihood
that the "law of the land clause" (derived from magna charta) was applicable. Id. at 254-
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Two later cases, in 1818 and 1820, also involved property deprivations; both were takings for public purposes. In both cases, Singleton v. Commissioners2 96 and Stark v. M'Gowen,2 9 7 the court reached
conclusions that made a ruling on the validity of the taking unnecessary. In both, however, the court's opinion suggested that the
power of eminent domain was governed by the constitution, magna
charta, and "fundamental principles of government."2 9 8 Except for
one 1805 case, discussed below, I have found no cases between Bowman in 1792 and Singleton in 1820 to suggest that South Carolina
moved toward textualism. Thus, the oblique references in the later
cases may plausibly be read as a continuation of the views expressed
in more detail in the very early cases.
Not only did most eighteenth and early nineteenth century American lawyers believe that natural law was judicially enforceable, they
also viewed constitutions themselves as merely reflective of natural
law. In keeping with this prevalent view of constitutional rights as
merely confirming natural rights, the South Carolina courts interpreted the "law of the land" clause as recognizing traditional rights,
rather than creating new ones. The most extensive discussion of
this clause is found in Zyistra v. Corporation of Charleston,29 9 a 1794
case, and Lindsay v. Commissioners,30 0 a 1796 case.
In Zylstra, the plaintiff was convicted of keeping a tallow-chandler's shop within the city limits, in violation of a city bylaw. 3 0 He
challenged his conviction primarily on the ground that a fine over
twenty pounds (he was fined 100 pounds) could not be imposed
without a jury trial. 30 2 The court unanimously reversed his
3 03
conviction.
Judge Waties's opinion, which was the most extensive, drew on
both the written constitution and unwritten law. His first task was to
reconcile the "law of the land" clause with the jury trial clause of the
1790 Constitution. Did the former mean, the judge asked, that "any
law ... may be passed, directing a different mode of trial?"3 0 4 The
answer rested on the definition and derivation of "law of the land,"
which Judge Waties, quoting Lord Coke, interpreted as "the com296. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 526, 527 (1820).
297. 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 387, 387 (1818).
298. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) at 528; Stark, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at
393.

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 391-92 (1794).
2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 38 (1796).
1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 387-97.
Id. at 391.
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mon law or acts of parliament, down to the time of Edw. II which are
considered as part of the common law." 30 5 Thus, the "law of the
land" clause authorized a non-jury trial only in those cases in which
it had been permitted under the common law. 30 6 Zylstra's conviction by the city wardens for violating a city bylaw did not come
30 7
within that definition.
Having concluded that the "law of the land" clause did not conflict with the jury trial clause, Judge Waties faced his second question.3 0 Counsel for the city had argued that "it is now too late to
question the authority of the court of wardens, because it was created before the making of the constitution, and is therefore confirmed by it."3° 9 Judge Waties suggested that that might be true if
"the constitution was the first acquisition of the rights of the people
of this country." 31 0 Trial by jury, however, was an ancient and inalienable right and existed long before the constitution. 31 ' The constitution recognized but did not create the right:
But the trial by jury is a common law right; not the creature of
the constitution, but originating in time immemorial; it is the
inheritance of every individual citizen, the title to which commenced long before the political existence of this society; and
which has been held and used inviolate by our ancestors, in
succession, from that period to our own time; having never
been departed from, except in the instances before mentioned. This right, then is as much out of the reach of law as
312
the property of the citizen.
Thus, Judge Waties used the concept of natural rights to interpret
the meaning of the constitutional provision, and reaffirmed the
common belief that enforceable rights existed independent of the
written constitution. Moreover, according to the court reporter,
"[t]he city ordinance in question was afterwards repealed, and no
attempt was ever after made to exercise so unwarrantable a
jurisdiction."3 13
The relationship between the constitutional "law of the land" language and natural rights was further illuminated in Lindsay. The
Commissioners of the city of Charleston took a piece of Lindsay's
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.

Id. at 392.
See id. at 397-98.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.
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land to build a road.3 1 4 Lindsay argued that the taking of his land
with neither compensation nor trial by jury was "unconstitutional
and unjust," citing the "law of the land" clause and the jury trial
clause of the 1790 Constitution.3 1 5 There was thus considerable
discussion among both counsel and the court as to the exact meaning of the "law of the land" clause. 31 6 All seemed to agree that the
"law of the land" predated the written constitution, that it drew on
the common law which in turn represented natural law or reason,
and that the written constitution merely reaffirmed these more ancient rights and laws rather than creating new law.3 1 7
The city recorder argued that although the taking of A's land to
give to B might violate "both magna charta and our own constitution," the taking of land for public purposes "was the law of the land
long before magna charta was ever thought of, or our constitution
promulgated. 3 1 8 The right of the state to take land for public
roads was "coeval with civil society," and "part of the ancient law of
the land."3 1 9 The South Carolina Attorney General, also arguing
on behalf of the city, similarly argued that taking land for public
roads was "a fundamental and inherent right, which the supreme
3 20
authority of every state possessed."
The Attorney General demonstrated that eminent domain was a
fundamental right by canvassing respected authorities such as Vattel
and Rousseau.3 2 1 He then concluded:
From the foregoing principles of eminent civilians and writers
upon public law and national rights, and the early, long and
uninterrupted adoption and use of them by our legislatures,
...and the ready acquiescence in them by the citizens, this
important right has become a part of the common law of South
3 22
Carolina.
Common law, he continued, was "nothing more than natural truths,
founded on the nature and reason of things. " 3' 2 3 It was derived
from "usages and customs" rather than from written documentation. 324 The Attorney General's suggestion that usage might create
law accorded with some dicta in the Zylstra case: there Judge Waties
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 38 (1796).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-56.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45-47.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
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justified one type of non-jury courts as within the "lex
terrae" on
32 5
the ground that "they are sanctioned by long use."
The city recorder in Lindsay also echoed earlier cases in suggesting that the right of eminent domain was an ancient right, "recognized by magna charta and confirmed to the state by our own
constitution.- 3 2 6 Thus, even constitutional provisions not protecting individual rights were sometimes mere declarations of natural
law. 32 7 Tradition, not writing, gave the state its constitutional
power of eminent domain.
The court was evenly divided on Lindsay's motion for an order
328
enjoining the city from taking the land without compensation.
The injunction (called a "prohibition") was therefore not
32 9
granted.
Although the four judges disagreed on whether the plaintiff deserved compensation for the taking of his land, they agreed that the
source of both the state's and the plaintiff's rights was tradition and
natural law. Judges Grimke and Bay considered the taking "authorized by the fundamental principles of society." 33 0 They reiterated
the standard view of the constitution, and especially the "law of the
land" clause, as merely declarative of pre-existing rights:
[The taking] was neither against magna charta, nor the state
constitution, but part of the lex terrae, which both meant to
defend and protect. The so much celebrated magna charta of
Great Britain, was not a concession of rights and privileges,
which had no previous existence; but a restoration, and confirmation of those, which had been usurped, or had fallen into
disuse. It was therefore only declaratory of the well known
and established laws of the kingdom.
So, in like manner the 2d section of the 9th article of our
state constitution [the "law of the land" clause], confirms all
the before-mentioned principles. It was not declaratory of any
3 31
new law, but confirmed all the ancient rights and principles.
As in Zylstra, these judges relied on the written constitution only as a
written declaration of the ancient unwritten constitution.
Judge Waties, with whom Judge Burke agreed, thought that Lind33 2
say was entitled to compensation for the land taken by the city.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

1 S.C.L. at 393.
Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 42.
Id.
Id. at 56-62.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
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Like his brethren, Judge Waties found that the "law of the land"
meant the ancient common law rather than "any law which the legislature might pass." 353 Citing only a brief quotation from Blackstone
and an anecdote about the sultan Mustapha of Turkey and a mosque
in Constantinople, Waties concluded that a taking without compensation "has not complied with the terms of the common law, and is
not conformable to the constitution."" s4 Compensation for a taking
was, moreover, "deeply founded in natural justice.""s 5
The definition of the "law of the land" as ancient and customary
law was reaffirmed by Judge Waties sitting in equity in 1811. In
Byrne v. Stewart, he held that a law prohibiting "ordinaries" (roughly
equivalent to justices of the peace) from also practicing law did not
violate the "law of the land" clause.336 He defined the "lex terrae"
as "the common law ...[and] all acts of force at the time of making
33 7

the constitution.
Finally, as late as 1824, the court still found natural law principles
useful in an eminent domain case. In dicta in Dunn v. City Council,
the court limited the power of eminent domain to the taking of land
necessary for the particular public purpose.33 8 Despite Justice
Nott's disclaimer that the court had no authority to strike down unjust laws, but only unconstitutional ones, he tied the written and
unwritten fundamental law together. "[T]o take the property of one
man, and give it to another," he wrote, "would ... be contrary to

those immutable principles of justice and common law,,which have
been consecrated by universal consent from time immemorial, and
which are secured to us by the plain and unequivocal language of
the constitution." 33 9
Thus, between 1792 and 1824, South Carolina courts interpreted
and reviewed state statutes-occasionally invalidating them-ac333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 60.
3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 466, 480 (1811).

337. Id. at 478. An 1818 case in the U.S. Supreme Court echoed the South Carolina
definition of the "law of the land." Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235,

244 (1818).

Interpreting Maryland's "law of the land" clause (identical to South

Carolina's), Justice Johnson held that it was "intended to secure the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the power of government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice." Id.
338. 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 189, 199-200 (1824).
339. Id. at 200. He went on to note that "judges would.., be authorized to declare

[any statute permitting such a taking] inoperative and void." Id.
Counsel for plaintiffs had made an even stronger argument, suggesting that "[t]he
rights of the citizens of this country are guarded not by the constitution alone, but by the
general and universally recognized principles of right and wrong." Id. at 193.
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cording to the dictates of justice and natural reason, as well as the
language of the written constitution. The constitution itself was in
fact held to reflect and codify pre-existing natural law. Fundamental
rights that did not appear in the written constitution were enforced
nonetheless, and sometimes provisions of the written constitution
were ignored in favor of unwritten law.
Only once during this period did the court rely solely on the written constitution. In 1805, in White v. Kendrick, the court invalidated
an 1801 act extending the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to
cases involving up to thirty dollars.3 40 The court concluded that the
act violated the provision of the constitution guaranteeing a jury
trial "as heretofore used."'3 4 1 Judge Wilds, writing for a majority of
the court, noted: "The constitution, in the clause alluded to, has
established an epoch, from which legislative innovation on the trial
by jury shall cease."'3 4 2 A careful analysis of jury trials up to the
adoption of the 1790 Constitution led him to conclude that magistrates sitting alone could not take cognizance of any case worth
more than twenty dollars.3 43 It is unclear, of course, whether the
court would have found a similar guarantee even in the absence of a
specific provision of the written constitution; the earlier cases suggest that it might have done so. In any case, White neither supports
nor undermines the other cases' reliance on natural law.
E. Epilogue
State court judges, at least in these representative states, apparently appealed to natural law concepts for a considerably longer period of time than did their federal counterparts.3 4 4 But the idea of
340. 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 469, 473 (1805).
341. Id. at 470.
342. Id. at 471.
343. Id. at 472-73.
344. There are a number of possible explanations for this discrepancy. The greater
heterogeneity of the federal sphere may have produced a faster degeneration of popular
consensus, which might have made it more difficult for courts to maintain that natural
law decisions were consistent with popular sovereignty. See Nelson, supra note 23, at
928-32; H. Jefferson Powell, Reaching the Limits of TraditionalConstitutionalScholarship, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 1128, 1139 (1986) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, A REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985)). There may have been less need for federal recourse
to natural law after Marshall packed many natural law concepts into various clauses of
the written Constitution during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. See
WHITE, supra note 7, at 602-628; cf. GARY JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATION (1986) (suggesting that Court used written text
infused with natural law rather than directly appealing to natural law); Leslie F.
Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, The Origins of Judicial Review, and the Revival of Unwritten
Law, 48 J. POL. 51 (1986) (suggesting that Supreme Court did not appeal directly to
natural law, but instead combined natural law with written law); Gary J.Jacobsohn, E. T.:
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enforceable natural rights continued to influence American law and
politics even later than these cases would indicate. The ante-bellum
debate over slavery had a strong natural rights flavor,3 4 5 and Congressional debates over the Reconstruction Amendments similarly
relied on various conceptions of natural law.3 4 6 Indeed, American
infatuation with and judicial use of natural law concepts continued
well into the second half of the nineteenth century.3 4 7 Today, one
might argue, natural rights have not disappeared, but have rather
gone underground and re-emerged in the guise of privacy, due process, or other phrases of great majesty and little specific contentmuch like the phrases used by the nineteenth century courts surveyed in this article.
CONCLUSION

I hope I have illuminated our constitutional past enough to shatter the myths with which I began this essay. Textualism is not an
inevitable concomitant of a written constitution, and it is not a reflection of our earliest national heritage. Nevertheless, it is undeniably our self-professed modem understanding of the constitution.
What we do not know-and what these cases cannot tell us-is
whether a judiciary animated by principles of natural right is necessarily incompatible with either diversity or popular sovereignty.
Can justice still matter to judges in a society in which justice is controversial and "natural law" lacks credibility? Our next question
must be whether we can reconcile our natural law past with our textualist present-and whether we even want to.
The Extra-Textual in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 21 (1984) (noting
that Court's use of written constitution allowed for influx of natural law into decisions).
345. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITTrrION 258-71 (1990) (tracing antislavery Republicans' use of natural law to
support view that slavery was immoral); Earl Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the
Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305 (arguing antebellum thought to be based on
core set of basic rights) (1988); Nelson, supra note 64, at 525 (discussing antislavery

jurisprudence).
346. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 345, at 298-300; see also MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 53-54

(1986) (reviewing various Congressional Republicans' views on constitutional
protections).
347. See generally CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930)
(tracing development of natural law doctrines in American and European law); BENJAMIN
F. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw (1931) (tracing development
of natural law doctrines in American and European law); Emily F. Hartigan, Law and
Mystery: Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of the Law of State Constitutions, 6 J. L. &
RELIGION 225 (1988) (discussing state courts' use of natural law in late 19th century).
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